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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of
Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation allows the economy to function
more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and
employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring an inflation near the 3
per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three months, in order to establish the
monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful
consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook,
money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance transparency, the Bank
publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report on Inflation presents the
inflation forecasts prepared by the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate, as well as the macroeconomic developments
underlying these forecast. The Report is published biannually, while twice a year partial updates of the forecasts are also
prepared. The forecasts of the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in
producing its forecasts, the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In
respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are
applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics and Monetary Policy Directorate’s staff under the general
direction of Ágnes CSERMELY, Deputy Director. The project was managed by Mihály András KOVÁCS, Deputy Head of
Economic Analysis, with the help of Zoltán GYENES, Gergely KISS, Szabolcs LÕRINCZ and Barnabás VIRÁG. The Report was
approved for publication by Ferenc KARVALITS, Deputy Governor.
Primary contributors to this Report also include, Péter GÁBRIEL, Péter GÁL, Cecília HORNOK, Hedvig HORVÁTH, Éva KAPONYA,
Gergely KISS, András KOMÁROMI, Zsolt LOVAS, Szabolcs LÕRINCZ, Balázs PÁRKÁNYI, Dániel PALOTAI, Márton PERESZTEGI, Barnabás
TÓTH MÁTÉ. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Economics and
Monetary Policy Directorate. 
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following its meetings on 7
May 2007 and 21 May 2007. However, the projections and policy considerations reflect the views of the Economics and
Monetary Policy Directorate staff and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary Council or the MNB.
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This May issue of the Report contains a forecast for 2009 for the first time, as
it was deemed necessary in order to be able to provide a better assessment of
the developments taking shape over the 5- to 8-quarter forecast horizon
relevant for monetary policy. In this forecast which covers close to three years,
we expect gradual consolidation once the direct impacts of the fiscal
adjustments fade. Inflation is projected to start a gradual decline in the second
quarter of 2007 and, according to our baseline forecast, the inflation target will
be reached at the horizon relevant for monetary policy. After this year’s
considerable slowdown, the economy is expected to recover, although the GDP
growth rate will not be able to reach its potential by the end of the horizon.
Primarily in this year, we predict substantial improvements in fiscal indicators
and external balance indices, due to the government measures implemented
recently.
Relative to our February forecast, we expect the disinflationary process to slow
down until the end of next year. One reason for this is the upward trend in oil
prices seen in recent months, which is likely to generate greater and longer
lasting inflationary impacts due to the cuts in the gas price compensation
scheme. Another factor pointing towards higher inflation is the rapid wage
growth seen in the private sector. This very strong growth in wages in recent
months – which can only be attributed to whitening to a lesser degree – is
certainly not consistent with price stability over the medium term.
The tightening of monetary conditions in recent months will only be able to
offset these impacts to a certain degree. As the output gap will remain negative
over the entire forecast horizon, the real economy will have a disinflationary
effect.
Based on trend indicators, which are adjusted for the impact of the regulatory
environment (including the changing seasonal pattern of bonus payments and
whitening), within the private sector as a whole, there is a distinct difference
between the inflationary impact of wage dynamics in the manufacturing sector
and in the service sector. In the manufacturing sector, the high rate of
productivity is consistent with the wage dynamics observed. By contrast, in the
service sector wages tend to generate increasing cost pressure, and
consequently reduce the rate of profitability in the corporate sector. Over the
medium run, there are potentially three main channels for adjustment; namely
prices, wages and employment. In the baseline scenario, over the near term we
expect to see strong wage adjustment and modest price pressure; this view is
supported by the modest increase in the prices of wage dynamics would not
decline to the extent we have expected market services during the first few
months of this year. Nevertheless, the risk of wage dynamics higher than our
expectation still persist, and this would mean greater price increases than our
baseline scenario. This outcome carries inflationary risks especially if it is
related to persistently higher price and wage expectations.
The starting point of the forecast of the real economy is robust external
economic activity and the weaker-than-expected domestic demand in the
second half of 2006. We continue to believe that the Hungarian economy will
Gradual consolidation, the inflation
target might be achieved within the
policy horizon
Slower disinflation up to the end of 2008
Wages well above productivity in the
service sector
Substantial slowdown in growth in 2007
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Overview
slow down even further in 2007, due primarily to declining household
consumption. Once the impacts of fiscal measures fade, the economy may
slowly recover and domestic components play a greater role in growth.
Thanks to the favourable external environment, exports will remain strong in
the coming years, as was the case last year. In our forecast we still project
consumption smoothing by households, while their incomes will continue to
fall this year, although not quite as much as we previously expected. In the
following years the growth rate of consumption is expected to increase in line
with a renewed increase in household incomes.
Following last year’s decline, investment is expected to gradually recover this
year, but significant growth is unlikely before 2009 in spite of the fact that the
absorption of EU funds is expected to grow.
According to our forecast, the accrual-based budget deficit (ESA deficit) may
come in below the deficit target indicated in Hungary’s convergence
programme for both 2007 and 2008, due largely to the stronger-than-expected
growth in revenues. Our baseline forecast in 2009 is slightly in excess of the
government’s objectives, with an approximately symmetrical risk distribution.
External balance indicators are likely to improve further in the coming years.
This year’s reduction in external financing requirement is attributed mainly to
the sharp decrease in the budget deficit, while the private sector’s financing
requirement may increase in the wake of consumption smoothing and a more
intense investment environment.
During the 2008–2009 period we forecast a smaller reduction in the external
financing requirement. On the one hand, the rate of reduction in the budget
deficit will be slower than the rate we have seen this year, and on the other
hand the financing requirement of the corporate sector may increase as the
economy continues to pick up, and these two impacts can be off-set only by
growing household savings.
In summary, it can be stated that in line with the main scenario, a significant
decline in inflation may begin in the second half of this year, bringing the price
index to a level consistent with the inflation target over the relevant monetary
policy horizon of 5–8 quarters. Consistent with our previous forecasts, the
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Vibrant export growth, turning point in
investment
Lower-than-expected budget deficit in
2007 and 2008, increasing risks in 2009
Improving external balance
Upside risks in inflation
Inflation forecast fan chart
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baseline scenario is surrounded by significant bi-directional uncertainties and,
on the whole, the risks are on the upside. The adjustment of the labour market
constitutes the major risk factor pointing toward higher inflation, if it is related
to higher price and wage expectations. If the disinflationary impact of the
negative output gap is stronger than our forecast, or if there is a greater decline
in demand components, this may result in lower inflation. The distribution of
risks relating to the GDP forecast is symmetrical in our view in both years.
OVERVIEW
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GDP forecast fan chart
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(The forecasts are conditional: the main scenario reflects the most probable scenario only if all the assumptions presented
materialise; unless otherwise specified, percentage changes on a year earlier)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Actual Projection
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.2 2.4 5.7 3.4 3.1
Consumer price index 3.6 3.9 7.3 3.6 2.8
Economic growth**
External demand (GDP-based) 2.0 3.8 3.0 2.4 2.4
Impact of fiscal demand2 0.8 0.8 -3.4 -1.6 -0.3
Household consumption 3.8 1.2 -0.8 0.6 1.8
Gross fixed capital formation 5.6 -1.8 2.3 4.6 5.9
Domestic absorption** 1.4 0.5 0.0 1.7 3.2
Exports 11.6 18.0 15.3 11.8 9.5
Imports3,** 6.8 12.6 12.2 10.7 9.4
GDP3 4.2 (4.5)* 3.9 (4.0) 2.5 2.8 3.4
Current account deficit3,**
As a percentage of GDP 6.8 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.2
EUR billions 6.0 5.2 4.9 4.9 4.9
External financing requirement3,**
As a percentage of GDP 6.0 5.0 3.3 2.3 1.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.9 8.7 7.2 6.2 5.0
Whole-economy employment5 0.0 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings 6.9 9.5 8.6 7.1 6.3
Private sector employment5 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Private sector unit labour cost 2.2 5.8 5.9 4.6 3.2
Household real income 3.6*** 0.1*** -2.8 2.3 2.3
1
For technical reasons, the indicator that we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it
follows a similar trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As
a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 actual current account deficit and external financing requirement may
be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO labour
force survey.
* In 2005 calendar effects caused a downward distortion of GDP by some 0.2 percentage points. In order for trends in growth to be assessed, these effects
must be applied to adjust the original data; corrected values are shown in brackets.
** Our projection includes the impact of the Hungarian Army’s Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases community
consumption and imports.
*** MNB estimate.
Summary table of the main scenario
1. Financial markets

Apart from some temporary disturbances, the environment
for international investments remained favourable over the
last six months by historical standards. Investors’ high risk
appetite continues to be supported by low interest rates in the
developed markets, and the dynamic growth of emerging
markets with improving fundamentals and an attractive yield
environment. The relative stability seen in the global money
and capital markets is also attributed to the fact that the
monetary tightening cycle in the advanced economies did not
cause any major surprise and that the economic outlook did
not go through any substantial changes.
On the other hand, the negative shocks in risk appetite had a
global impact during the aforementioned half-year period.
The primary source of these shocks was the less favourable
growth outlook of the US economy and the deteriorating
attractiveness of carry trade strategies. Towards the end of
February bad news emerged about the Chinese and the
American economies, and the dispute about Iran’s nuclear
programme flared up again. Consequently, a significant
capital reallocation took place, moving funds from risky
investment instruments to less risky ones.
On the stock markets major adjustments took place. The
implied stock market volatility quotations nearly doubled from
an all-time low, and approached the levels seen during the
money and capital market turbulence last May. The sudden
drop in risk appetite, however, resulted in significantly less
adjustments in the foreign exchange market, and the volatility
of exchange rates rose slightly relative to the stock markets. In
the foreign exchange markets the high-yield currencies (Brazil
real, South African rand, Turkish lira) were hit the hardest, and
together with the substantial gain of the Japanese yen this
indicated the scaling back of carry trade positions.
As it turned out, the adjustments in the money and capital
markets were only temporary. Asset prices recovered
relatively quickly and were soon back up to the levels prior
to the sell-off. Subsequently, the interest premium on risky
debt instruments once again dropped to an all-time low, or
close to it. All in all, the magnitude of the adjustments and
the path leading to it shows that the willingness of investors
to undertake risk could be vulnerable under the present
circumstances, and that there is only limited room for any
further improvement in risk appetite.
The global economic outlook nonetheless remains favourable.
Analysts expect the global economy to grow around 5 per cent
this year, as in the past years. However, the rate of growth in
the various regions may differ from what it has been in recent
years. The most important change from the perspective of
financial markets is that the growth rate in the euro area is
expected to reach the growth rate of the American economy.
The majority of market participants expect to see the rate of
economic expansion in the US slow down somewhat this year
from the long-term rate, while the euro area is predicted to
grow a little above potential.
FINANCIAL MARKETS
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 2007 13
Chart 1-1
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Chart 1-2
Stock market indices (1 January 2007=0)
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Chart 1-3
Implied stock market volatility
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VIX Index (S&P 500) Dj Stoxx volatility index
The pricing of money market instruments is consistent with
somewhat looser monetary policy from the Fed around the
end of this year and with a continuation of the monetary
tightening cycle by the ECB. Due to the expansion of the
euro area economy and the steady rise in forward reference
euro interest rate expectations, the euro appreciated sharply
during the last six months vis-à-vis the currencies of the
developed economies, reaching an absolute high against the
yen and the dollar.
Looking ahead, from the perspective of the environment for
international investments, the uncertainty surrounding the
US economy constitutes the greatest risk. On the one hand, if
the rate of slowdown is higher than forecasted, it could
trigger a renewed reallocation of capital to less risky
instruments (above all to developed market government
bonds), which in turn could lead to significant adjustments in
stock market prices and in exchange rates of high-yield
currencies in emerging markets. In spite of the fact that
inflation trends in the US have improved slightly in the past
six months, the level of inflation is still higher than what is
considered desirable by the Fed. Therefore, on the other
hand, any unfavourable developments on the inflation front
may once again trigger inflation fears and higher interest rate
expectations, similar to last May, and that could have a
negative impact on asset prices in the emerging markets.
On the whole, financial markets expect to see favourable
environment for international investments, dynamic global
economic growth and a gradual reduction in the current
imbalances. However, looking at the prices of risky
instruments, it appears that investors’ demand for these
instruments rose to unusual highs even by historical
comparison, which means that the risk appetite of investors
could be very sensitive to unfavourable economic and geo-
political developments.
Amidst the favourable external conditions, starting from the
end of November there was a shift in investors’ sentiment
toward Hungarian instruments. The forint exchange rate
appreciated from EUR/HUF 260 in late November to
EUR/HUF 245-250 by April. In addition to the favourable
environment for international investments, macroeconomic
developments in Hungary also played a decisive role in the
forint gaining strength and hence in the improving
confidence of investors in Hungary.
During the last half-year period we have seen a positive
change in Hungarian macroeconomic balance indicators. In
the fourth quarter of 2006 the current account deficit turned
out better than what analysts had expected, and the general
government deficit in 2006 and during the first four months
of 2007 also reflected more favourable numbers than what
had been anticipated by the Ministry of Finance. All in all,
investors appear to have been convinced that the economy
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Chart 1-4
Trends in emerging market currencies and the 
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Chart 1-5
Volatility of exchange rates in the developed markets
(G7) and in the emerging markets (EM) as calculated
by JP Morgan
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Chart 1-6
EUR/HUF exchange rate
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has embarked on a path of reducing the significant internal
and external imbalances. At the same time, the gradual
reduction in the uncertainty related to the rise in inflation
over the past six months, and its stabilization at the level
expected by the central bank and the market participants
alike, triggered appreciation of the forint and stronger rate
cut expectations. Based on the yield curve, at the end of
November investors were expecting the base rate to settle at
7.5 per cent by the end of 2007, and at 7 per cent by the end
of 2008; by mid May these expectations had dropped to 6.75
per cent for the end of 2007 and 6.5 per cent for the end of
2008.
Late last year and in the first months of this year, due to the
decline in uncertainty from domestic political turmoil and
steps taken by the credit rating institutions, the exchange rate
settled in at EUR/HUF 251-259. S&P improved its rating of
Hungarian debt servicing capacity from negative to stable,
while Moody’s downgraded its rating from A1 to A2. In the
latter case, however, the extent of the downgrade was below
market expectations, and therefore, on the whole it had a
positive impact on the markets.
At the same time, the fact that required premiums on long-
term forint investments did not decrease substantially was a
sign that investors were taking a more cautious position. The
markets adopted a wait-and-see approach, for at this time the
first results of the macroeconomic adjustments were not yet
visible and because there was considerable uncertainty as to
how high inflation might rise. However, the drop in the
prices of Hungarian instruments triggered by negative shocks
in the demand of investors for risky instruments in late
February was minor and temporary, thanks in part to
favourable sentiment of investors toward the region, and also
to improving confidence in macroeconomic developments in
Hungary.
In early March, the demand for forint investments started to
increase again quickly. The lower level of premium settled in
April, which may indicate that in investors’ view the
sustainability of macroeconomic adjustments has increased
considerably since last November, thereby boosting their
confidence in forint instruments. On the other hand, the fact
that the premium is still considered high within the region
indicates a great degree of uncertainty surrounding the
Hungarian convergence process.
Beside the aformentioned factor, the revaluation of the
Slovakian currency exchange rate band also led to forint
appreciation, causing the Hungarian currency to break out of
the EUR/HUF 251-259 trading range of the previous months.
There was talk among market participants about the
possibility of the Hungarian exchange rate band being
abolished. According to market information, the majority of
investors did not expect any shift in the Slovakian exchange
rate band, and several of them took on a speculative position
instigated by the rumours floating about the abolishment of
the Hungarian exchange rate band. Consequently, the
exchange rate appreciated all the way up to EUR/HUF 245.
In the month of March the forint positions of foreign
investors increased by close to 400 billion forints, and their
holdings of government bonds reached an all-time high.
In line with market expectations, the central bank held its
reference interest rate at 8 per cent throughout this past half-
year period. At the same time, market participants gradually
reduced their expectations for the year-end base rate
essentially in parallel with the appreciation of the forint and
with inflation following the projected path. According to
Reuters surveys the number of analysts expecting any further
increase in the interest rate dropped from month to month,
FINANCIAL MARKETS
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Chart 1-8
Five-year forward premium above euro yields on
currencies of the region 5 years ahead 
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Chart 1-7
Central bank base rate and the base rate estimated
from the yield curve for the end of 2007 and 2008
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while the projected date for the first interest rate cuts was
also brought forward on several occasions. Monetary
conditions became stricter during the past half-year period
due primarily to appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
However, the one-year forward real interest rate dropped
slightly in recent months in response to the reduction in
short-term yields, while the level of real interest rate is at 3–4
per cent, as seen in previous years.
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Chart 1-9
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2. Inflation and the major 
factors behind its development

In 2006, the rate of economic growth reached 3.9 per cent
(4.0 per cent adjusted for the calendar effect), close to the
average recorded in previous years.
1
GDP growth, however,
slowed during the year in the wake of fiscal adjustments,
while the composition of growth is characterised by
increasing duality. Growth in internal demand was somewhat
less dynamic, whereas net exports – thanks to increasingly
robust external economic activity – were better than expected
last year. There was a decline in consumption despite
outstanding wage growth, and investments slowed down in
spite of favourable export conditions, while lacklustre
demand in the government sector was below expectations as
well, considering the fact that 2006 was an election year. The
historically high contribution of net exports to growth was
the result of stronger exports driven by favourable
international economic activities, combined with slower
growth in imports prompted by weaker internal demand.
Good performance in external markets, however, was
insufficient to offset the unfavourable developments in
Hungary. From the second half of the year it became
apparent that Hungary’s economic growth was losing
momentum compared to other countries in the region, and
our advantage relative to the economic growth of the euro
area vanished.
The dualistic nature of growth is well illustrated by the fact that
over the last two years the growth rate of domestic income in
real terms (RGDI) remained below the growth rate of real GDP
(gross domestic product), primarily due to a decline in the terms
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 2007 19
2.1. Economic activity
1 The preliminary Q1 GDP data for 2007 was published by the Central Statistical Office after the information set for the Report had been closed. The data shows 2.9
percent (3.0 per cent without calendar effects) real GDP growth for the first three month of the year compared to corresponding period of the previous year. Bearing
in mind the uncertainty of the preliminary data, the growth number is in line with our expectations, hence, at least until the details are known, our overall
conjunctural assessment of the Hungarian economy remains largely unchanged. 
2 GDI is calculated by the following formula: 
GDIreál = GDPreál + {(X – M )/[( Px + Pm)/2] – (X/Px – M/Pm)},
where X and M stand for exports and imports at current costs, Px and Pm are the deflators of exports and imports. When GDP grows faster than GDI, it means that –
in real terms – the income of domestic economic agents grew slower than what is indicated in the GDP growth rate.
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Chart 2-3
The difference of GDP and GDI in the region*
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of trade triggered by rising energy prices. 
2 
This difference is
considered high compared to previous figures and also relative
to other countries in the region. In addition, it is consistent with
the fact that domestic absorption in Hungary was at an all-time
low and the component of GDP growth driven by the export
sector was higher than the historical average.
Hungarian exports are dynamic, but can they be
sustained?
The unexpected growth in external demand triggered a
stronger-than-expected increase in exports. At the same time,
the foreign trade balance of goods and services was positive
for the first time in many years.
Hungary’s foreign trade balance improved despite the
deterioration in the terms of trade caused by higher imported
energy prices. The favourable shift in volumes – i.e. export
volumes were significantly higher than imports –
compensated for this impact. However, the improvement in
the trade balance was not exclusively caused by the efficiency
of the export sector, as weak import demand due to sluggish
domestic demand was also a contributing factor.
3
The principal reason for the upturn in exports was the
unexpectedly high import demand from the German
economy and its closest partners. Business confidence
indicators (e.g. IFO) reflecting the views and expectations of
managers in Germany have been at historic highs for several
months.
Accordingly, foreign trade data from the early part 2007 also
indicate the robust expansion in exports. At the same time,
according to the latest information there are some signs of
stronger import dynamics well, which may foreshadow a
pause in the improving trend of foreign trade balance.
In order to determine the degree of sustainability of
Hungarian export dynamics, we should compare it to other
countries’ performance in the region, over a longer time
horizon. The results of our analysis point to question marks
as to how competitive Hungarian exports are in international
markets: while our market share in terms of volume is
considered favourable (similarly to our competitors), our
relative export prices have declined since the turn of the
millennium (see box below).
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Chart 2-4
Trade balance of goods and services in current prices
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Chart 2-5
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3 It must be noted that, however, that even though the foreign trade balance has been improving continuously since 2004, its development must be judged with
caution due to the methodological problems originating form the underestimation of imports and overestimation of exports. The degree of uncertainty is around 
2–3 per cent of GDP. For more details on this issue, please see Box II-1 and IV-5 in the Inflation Report of August 2005.
* Year on year volume indices from trend
** Year on year volume index
Over the past two years, the export output of the Visegrád Four has
been very favourable, thanks to buoyant economic activity in Europe. In
late 2006 and early 2007, the rate of growth in the export volume of
goods and services surged up to 20 per cent on average throughout the
region, with Hungary taking second place behind Slovakia. Taking the
perspective of a longer timeframe, apart from the brisk economic
activity in Europe, entry into new markets also enhanced the dynamic
growth of exports. On general principle, sales of goods to markets
outside the EU-25 increased considerably, in other words, the volume of
export sales shifted from the relative slow growing Western European
Box 2-1: How good is the Hungarian export performance in a regional comparison?
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4 See Jakab-Kovács-Oszlay: How far has Trade Integration Advanced?, MNB Working Papers 2000/1, or Bussiere et al.: Trade Integration of Central and Eastern European
Countries. Lessons from a Gravity Model, ECB Working Paper No. 545.
markets to markets outside the EU-25, mostly to Eastern European
markets.
Hungary took the lead in shifting the main stream of the export of goods
to markets outside the EU-25. While the overall volume of Hungarian
exports grew at a rate similar to our competitors between 2000 and 2006,
it showed the slowest growth rate in the EU-25 and the fastest growth rate
outside this area. This phenomena is consistent with the conclusions set
forth in the studies conducted concerning the foreign trade integration
within the region, notably that Hungary’s integration in foreign trade with
the EU-15 – unlike other countries in the region – came close to reaching
an equilibrium at the turn of the millennium, which could also be the
reason for the slower export dynamics in the EU markets.4
Looking more closely at the export performances in the region, which
appear favourable on the whole, it is found that trends in Hungary are
on a path somewhat different from the three competitors, which could
also raise doubts concerning the sustainability of the good export
performance, particularly because contrary to the dynamic growth in
volume Hungarian export sales paint a gloomier picture measured in
terms of current prices. Measured in euro, between 2000 and 2006
Hungary was the last in the region in terms of growth in exports, which
means that the relative export prices decreased compared to our
competitors. While the export price indices went up in the other three
countries of the region, the unit value of Hungarian exports stagnated
on the EU-25 markets, and decreased in markets outside the EU-25.
At this juncture, it is important to point out that changes in the export
unit value index could reflect the common price trends in the
destination market relative to a specific product structure, and/or a shift
in the product structure of the country toward higher priced products.
On general principle, the world market prices of goods supplied in
foreign trade were decreasing during the period under review, due
mostly to increasingly strong globalisation pressure. In this light, trends
in Hungarian export prices did not come as a surprise. However, lower
world market prices have a different effect on the various products.
While Hungary specialised in products whose prices had been typically
declining (office machines and telecommunications equipment), the
product structure of other countries in the region contained goods
fetching higher prices (e.g. motor vehicles).
Furthermore, another factor contributing to the relative decline of
Hungarian export prices is that the product structure of other countries
in the region has moved to a larger extent towards more advanced
(meaning higher priced) products. A review of the export product
structure of our competitors in the region supports the conclusion that
this shift in the product composition could well be the reason behind
the relative export price trends under review. Between 2000 and 2006,
the product structure of our competitors shifted toward a more
advanced product line, and especially in the Czech Republic and in
Slovakia the ratio of high-tech export goods increased considerably. On
the other hand, the Hungarian product structure in the high tech
segment failed to improve any further, due in part to the fact that it
started off from the highest level in the region.
The phenomena illustrated above carry a variety of messages regarding
the sustainability of Hungary’s export. The good news is that the difference
between the export growth rate in terms of volume, that is considered
good by regional comparison, and the unfavourable growth rate at
current prices (in other words, the declining relative export prices) are
attributed, for the most part, to world market trends, and also to current
developments in other countries of the region concerning technological
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Investments: temporary dip or long-term decline?
In 2006, there was a fall in the volume of investments for the
first time in more than ten years. This downward process
started in the second quarter, before the announcement of
the fiscal adjustment and was widespread across different
breakdowns. The two main types of investments,
construction and machinery, declined in tandem, and
estimates of the various sectors indicate downward trends in
the corporate and the household sector, with a significant
slowdown observed for the government sector as well.
In the wake of fiscal adjustments, the slower investment
activity in the non-tradable corporate sector (mostly in
services) is consistent with slowing domestic demand
expectations. The driving factor behind the decline in the
volume of household investments – apart from falling real
incomes due to fiscal adjustment – is the general depression
seen in the real estate market. The moderate investment
activity of the government-related sectors is the direct result
of the cutback on fiscal expenditures.
However, the declining willingness of industrial companies,
which rely mostly on external demand, to embark on new
investments is surprising in light of favourable external demand
conditions. For a long time, economic agents underestimated
the current robust economic activity in terms of strength and
durability. Consequently, they focused on improving their
capacity utilisation rather than increasing their investments.
This phenomena was observed in other countries of the region
and also in our export markets. However, in line with the
improving business outlook, the investments dynamics in these
countries began to increase over recent quarters, while in
Hungary, the trend is just the opposite, both in overall economy
investments as well as in the manufacturing industry.
The frail investment climate can be explained by the fact that
Hungary consistently fell behind the other countries of the
region in competitiveness rankings.
6
Additionally, the
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convergence, that took place in Hungary before the turn of the
millennium. In spite of all these factors, the Hungarian export structure
retained its leading position in the region in 2006, and it showed signs of
flexibility in exploring sales opportunities outside the EU-25 markets.
Nevertheless, the phenomena illustrated above also raise questions
about the future of the export sector in Hungary. It should definitely be
noted that the volume of high tech products in exports did not increase
during the past six years. Although the product structure of Hungarian
exports is considered advanced by international standards, there is still
room for improvement as demonstrated by the examples of certain
developed economies (such as Ireland first and foremost).5
Furthermore, regional trends indicate that we can expect increasing
competition from the emerging countries of the region in our
traditional markets. Although we could shift our main stream of export
sales from the EU-25 markets to markets outside the EU-25, according to
previous experience the markets outside the EU are able to receive
lower priced products (meaning goods of presumably lesser
technology and lower quality), therefore, the product structure of
Hungarian exports could be drawn in an unfavourable direction.
5 See: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005.
6 For more information consult our publication entitled “Report on Convergence (December 2006)”.
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Chart 2-9
Investments of the tradable sector and its capacity
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unsustainable fiscal path prior to the adjustment and the
ensuing corrections that had been unknown for a long time,
caused a considerable amount of uncertainty for the
corporate sector in terms of planning. The fiscal adjustment
mitigated this uncertainty to some extent, however, over the
short run, it certainly has increased the costs of companies.
The overall effect of these impacts – as presented by the data
available so far – had an unfavourable overall impact on the
expansion of capacities in the corporate sector.
However, from the beginning of 2007, investment indicators
(such as increasing volumes in construction and in the
imports of machinery
7
) might signal an upturn in the
dynamics of investments. These factors, coupled with a
minor decrease in the historically high capacity utilisation
and the still favourable external environment, point to a
slight correction in investments. However, looking ahead, the
pace of growth is expected to be lower than previously seen
during past international economic upturns, due to increased
burdens of the corporate sector and on account of signs that
Hungary is losing some of its competitive edge.
Declining household consumption: to what extent?
Last year, the rate of growth of household consumption
expenditures gradually declined, dropping to 1.5 per cent,
which was well below the average of previous years. At the
same time, it is difficult to assess the timing and extent of the
decline for methodological reasons.
8
Consequently,
household demand should be assessed on the basis of a
combination of several indicators (retail sales, confidence
indicators, etc.). Based on these, the slowdown in
consumption dynamics started during the second half of last
year, due to a significant fall in income prospects, and also
due to considerably lower current real incomes, on account
of higher taxes and the sudden surge of inflation towards the
end of the year.
The data reflected slower growth in retail sales for both
durable and non-durable goods, in line with the sharp decline
in consumer confidence indices during the period under
review. The slowdown in sales of non-durable goods started
somewhat later, during the second half of last year, justifying
the idea that demand for these types of goods is more closely
related to current real incomes.
At the same time, the fact that households’ real incomes have
been declining since the middle of last year while
consumption expenditure continued to grow at a moderate
rate, indicates that there has been consumption smoothing on
the part of households. This view is supported by the fact that
households continued to borrow, while their financial assets
continued to shrink.
Apart from the developments among households and in the
corporate sector, another factor behind the slower domestic
demand was that the government also cut back its
consumption expenditures in 2006 – in contrast with past
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
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7 Dynamic imports of machinery and transport vehicles cannot be solely explained by government-related, unique purchases (such as Combino trams and Gripen
military aircraft), as machinery imports are buoyant even without these items.
8 In our view, there is a gap between the incomes and the expenditures of Hungarian households in 2006, for which no feasible explanation is available. Possible
reasons behind this gap could be the whitening of the economy, and higher – yet unobserved (typically from imports) – consumption or savings. The former
hypothesis could be supported by any reduction in other incomes that can only be observed sometime in the future, while the latter is supported by the strong
purchases of foreign currencies on the part of the households.
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Consumption and its indicators*
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Chart 2-10
Annual average volume indices of gross fixed captial
formation in the region and in the main export
markets
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experience during election years – and this was felt both in
transfers in kind and public consumption.
9
Output: increasing divergence between industries
relying on domestic and external demand
Similar to the expenditure side of GDP, the production side
is also characterised by duality. The export-oriented
industrial sectors show signs of dynamic growth in
production and in value added, while the growth rate is
decreasing in the sectors supplying goods and services mainly
for the domestic market. The strong growth in industrial
export sales is consistent with strong exports and high
capacity utilisation, and also with the increase in employment
as well as working hours in the major export sectors (mainly
machinery).
Looking at value added of different sectors of the economy,
the most dynamic growth can be observed in the export-
oriented manufacturing. On the other hand, market services
has grown at a rate close to the historical average, showing
signs of slower growth toward the end of the year. The value
added contribution of construction and the agricultural
sector declined compared to the previous year. The drop in
the construction industry is attributed mostly to the
reduction in construction investment (real estate and
infrastructure), while the decline in the agricultural sector is
part of the correction process following the record high
growth of production in 2004.
The dual nature of growth can also be observed in the
productivity differences of the tradable and non-tradable sector.
The difference of labour productivity between manufacturing
and services has grown over the past quarters and was at a high
level throughout 2006. The reason for this development is that
employment has grown in the services sector, while
manufacturing saw a decline followed by a stagnation, and the
evolution of value added was just the opposite.
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Chart 2-12
Annualized monthly volume indices of trend
industrial production and sales
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Chart 2-13
Developments of real value added in major sectors*
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Chart 2-14
Annual changes of labour productivity 
in manufacturing and market services*
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9 The decline was rather significant. More specifically, the fall was over 5% in public expenditures, almost twice as much as we expected in February.
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 2007 25
Based on the data from the last three to four months, an
unexpected turning point is on the verge of materialising in
activity and unemployment: although employment is
stagnating, as we projected, a decline has started in both
activity and unemployment, the latter of which was
previously highly volatile. According to seasonally adjusted
data, the rate of activity is 55 per cent while unemployment
stands at 7.3 per cent.
10
After the sudden surge in the second half of 2006, wage
dynamics showed the first modest signs of loosing
momentum in February 2007. Payments of bonuses that were
brought forward to avoid higher taxes dropped off, and the
dynamics of regular wages also appear to be broken in the
month of February.
11
In spite of the fact that the high actual
data depict an unfavourable picture relative to our
projection, if the turning point is confirmed by future data, it
appears that the government measures affecting the labour
market generated a one-off shock and are unlikely to result in
any inflationary pressure over the long run.
Turning point in activity?
In our forecast released in November we predicted the labour
market to loosen further, employment to stabilise with a slight
increase in activity, and more volatile unemployment still
showing a rising trend. The reasons for this may be found in the
changes seen in the demographic composition of the workforce
(elderly workers replaced by a younger generation showing
signs of higher activity thanks to their higher and better quality
education), as well as the implementation of capital-labour
substitution that is especially typical for transition countries.
However, the data from the last three to four months point
in a different direction: a turning point appears imminent
both in the level of activity and employment (unemployment
continues to show a high degree of volatility), although
relying on quarterly data it appears that only our assessment
of activity is robust at the time being. Since November, the
number of active workers decreased by approximately
32,000 while the population remained practically the same,
and this development is reflected in decreasing
unemployment and also in the decline in employment.
Accordingly, the labour market – in contrast with our
previous expectations – will become tighter as far as supply is
concerned,
12
as along with low labour demand, instead of
becoming unemployed, people in their active years are
exiting the labour market. This means that those not
employed generate a smaller wage moderating effect on the
labour market than previously.
13
We are unable to determine at this time whether this is a real
turning point or just a temporary setback that may fit into the
noisiness of the processes; the government measures and the
expectations of households regarding the economy could,
however, offer a feasible explanation. In the latest period, in
relation to fiscal adjustment, several factors affected the
labour market.
2.2. Labour market
10 Among population aged 15-74.
11 According to seasonally adjusted data, the annualised monthly growth rate of gross average wages of full-time workers was at 7.9 per cent in February in the private
sector, while regular wage dynamics stood at 10.2 per cent.
12 According to experts, the categorisation of employment survey by way of international standards might not be accurate in terms of the categories of economics that
concerns us the most. For example, the definition of unemployment includes any worker who “did not work during the reference week, and who
• do not have a job from which they took a temporary leave of absence;
• was actively looking for a job during the period of four weeks prior to the survey;
• can take up employment within two weeks if able to find suitable work (availability).”
(Labour Force Survey Methodology 2006, CSO, Budapest, 2006, page 12) The category of ”registered unemployed worker” used by the Bureau of Employment offers
a better and more accurate definition of the jobless from an economic perspective, for it covers – unlike the labour market survey – all workers who registered
themselves in the local employment centres as job-seekers. On the other hand, from a chronological approach this indicator appears less volatile, for it has been
rising continuously since May 2006. Apart from the last few months, it more or less followed the rate of unemployment published by the CSO up until November
when they started to drift apart. This could be an indication that the unemployment of recent periods does not necessarily mean a tighter labour market.
13 Conceding to the traditional presumption of categorisation, according to which the inactive workers are less attached to the labour market, and that any worker
who is capable to generate wage bargaining procedures are considered unemployed, any reduction in the unemployment ratio, meaning the weakening of the
bargaining position aiming to cut wages, could have an unfavourable impact on wages in general.
Chart 2-15
Activity, employment and unemployment 
(thousand people, seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Both employers and employees were hit by the increased
taxes and mandatory contributions. These higher burdens
could result in lower demand for labour through higher
labour costs, in losing faith in finding a job and consequently
diminishing willingness on the part of job-seekers to find
employment, and in (persistently) declining desire to enter
into any work-related relationship due to meagre prospects in
terms of real wages. Downsizing in the public sector may
have exacerbated these processes, which – together with
retirement conditions becoming stricter – may have ended up
in the decline of the activity of job losers.
Moreover, the level of employment, apart from showing
signs of stagnation of perhaps some decline, shows an
extremely heterogeneous picture at the sectoral level. The
decline in the whole economy is basically due to the
decreasing workforce demand of the public sector, some
small private sub-sectors less significant from a conjunctural
point of view, small enterprises and the self-employed.
On the other hand, the demand for workers in the market
services sector continues to grow, with the sharpest increase
seen in January. Responsibility for all these events
undoubtedly lies in the following sub-sectors: trade and
repair, real estate and commercial services, financial
operations and other services. In principle, these are the very
sub-sectors that were affected the most by the regulatory
measures introduced for the whitening of the economy in
terms of workforce (in addition to incomes). This theory is
supported by the brief analysis of the Ministry of Finance,
according to which these are the sectors where the reduction
in the number of private entrepreneur “made up” for the
increase in the number of employees at companies with over
5 people.
14
In the manufacturing industry, at the same time, the
decreasing tendency that was previously blamed on structural
changes or on the capital-labour substitution, came to a stop
and levelled out by now.
15
Wage dynamics accelerate and then lose pace
In the second half of 2006, the dynamics of payments of
premiums and, in the subsequent months, the regular wages
indicated increased wage pressure. The labour-related tax
and contribution increases, adopted in two stages,
(September 2006 and January 2007) altered the seasonal
nature of payments of bonuses in the second half of 2006 and
during the early stages of this year. As we have mentioned
previously, in all likelihood these payments were brought
forward from September to July or August in an effort to
avoid the payment of extra taxes. The data from January and
February regarding payments of bonuses support this concept
as well. However, since the November Report we were able
to ascertain to some extent that bringing the payments
forward and the high bonuses are not the only reason behind
the strong dynamics of gross average wages (see box below).
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14 See also footnote 18 on this issue.
15 There is a slight increase in the number of working hours, which indicates an uncertain yet favourable outlook on the part of the relevant operators. (This is due
primarily to the machinery industry and it good export output.)
16 After our forecasts were completed we made the necessary re-adjustments, therefore, the figures contained in the main table of the Report for 2007-2009 indicate
the original and unadjusted forecasts consistent with the data published by the CSO. As in the forecast we used the adjusted series, it also means that it does not
offer a projection for whitening: it contains only the previous impact of whitening as we have estimated it for the period to which the forecast pertains.
Chart 2-16
Gross average wages and payments of bonuses in the
private sector 
(seasonally unadjusted monthly data, annual growth rates)
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There are two obstacles to analysing the wage data of previous months:
the changed seasonal nature of payments of bonuses, and the
“whitening” of certain types of remuneration. We have developed a
correction procedure for both of these problems, and we have used the
resulting adjusted series, as they are easier to understand for the
purposes of economics, in our analysis and forecast.16
Earlier payment of bonuses
In our opinion, the corporate sector reacted to the tax increases the
government announced last summer by bringing the payment dates of
certain bonus payments forward, in an effort to mitigate their tax
liabilities. There were two possible shifts. The first one was the payment
Box 2-2: From the gross average wage-index of the CSO to trend wages reflecting the economic cycle
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17 Here we report our analysis of quarterly data. We have also made all of the calculations described below with monthly data, upon which our estimate of whitening
did not change significantly.
18 The Ministry of Finance holds a similar view, adding that in the construction, retail and real estate sectors the reduction in the number of private entrepreneurs in
2006 roughly coincides with the number of new employees hired in these very same sectors, for which whitening could well be the reason. (Refer to “Report based
on the EKSZ 104 (7) article concerning the measures adopted for the implementation of the recommendations set forth by the Council of Ministers of Economy and
Finance on 10 October 2006” [Jelentés az EKSZ 104(7) cikke alapján a Gazdasági és Pénzügyminiszterek Tanácsa által 2006. október 10-én kiadott ajánlás
megvalósítása érdekében hozott intézkedésekrõl], Ministry of Finance, April 2007.)
19 As suggested by the Monetary Council, we have also carried out an adjustment using a larger set of “whitening” industries. Here – besides all the industries previously
mentioned – we included manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products; manufacturing of wood and paper, publishing and printing; hotels and restaurants. These
provide an additional 7% of private sector employment. The results were not particularly sensitive with respect to the change: the adjusted yearly average growth
rate did not change significantly, only the fourth quarter year-on-year index decreased by 0.1 percentage point. We did not detect whitening in the case of the wood
and paper, publishing and printing industry.
of some of the traditionally high year-end bonuses to employees in
August so as to ease the impact of higher taxes as of September. The
other was the presumed payment of some of the bonuses, which are
otherwise due in the beginning of 2007, at the end of 2006, with a view
to mitigating the impact of taxes going up once again in January. These
events also caused substantial changes in the seasonal nature of the
wage series, that was considered relatively stable in previous years.
The aforesaid altered seasonal pattern makes the process of seasonal
adjustment more difficult and distorts the economic interpretability of
the adjusted data. Consequently, we applied the following corrections.
From the core data from the period between August 2006 and January
2007 we subtracted the bonuses, then we re-distributed the aggregate
amount of six-months bonuses among these same months. In the
process of re-distribution we relied on data derived from the historically
characteristic seasonal pattern. The seasonal adjustment of the
resulting “shuffled” series is no longer a problem, and it can be better
interpreted economically.
“Whitening” of wages
According to anecdotal information, there is an increase in wages in
recent months prompted, perhaps, by the stricter approach the tax
authority has adopted and by other regulatory measures the
government has introduced. These wages are now more realistic in
terms of actual payments, in other words they are in the process of
“whitening”. We used regression methods to quantify whitening of the
regular wages. In essence, this means that we pulled wage indexes of
the sectors showing extremely high wage dynamics in the second half
of 2006 back to the level of other sectors boasting similar but more
disciplined wage dynamics. This adjusted wage index is referred to as
whitening-filtered index, and the difference between the two indicators
is known as the estimated impact of whitening.17
In connection with the estimate we have made two assumptions: (1)
The impact of whitening started to show after the second half of 2006,
and not before; (2) whitening is industry-specific, meaning that
certain industries are hardly affected by it, if at all. The first assumption
is based on the fact that potential whitening is attributed to the
government measures announced and/or introduced during the
summer (actions against pretended contracts, tighter control, double
contributions on minimum wages). What lies behind the second
assumption on the one hand is that the concealing of actual wages is
considered common practice – relying on anecdotal information –
only in certain industries, primarily in the service and construction
sectors.18 On the other hand, the growth rate of real wages surpassed
the growth of productivity during the period in question only in these
industries.
We chose the following three industries: the three major industries from
the service sector (trade-repair, transportation-warehousing, real
estate-commercial services) plus healthcare services; from the
manufacturing sector the industries entitled “Miscellaneous and other
manufacturing”; plus the construction industry. The service segments
selected comprise 82 per cent of the entire sector in terms of
employment, while all of the sub-sectors selected comprise 48 per cent
within the private sector in terms of employment.
The difference between the original wage series and the resulting
series of adjusted regular wages comprises the estimate for the degree
of whitening. We employed the same level of whitening in the
complete gross average earnings-series, with bonuses included, and
came to the conclusion that the original 9.5 per cent whole wage
increase in 2006 in the annual average dropped to 8.8 per cent
following the adjustment.19
Chart 2-17
Original and whitening-filtered gross average
earnings
(Annual growth rates of seasonally adjusted series)
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0
3
 Q
1
0
3
 Q
2
0
3
 Q
3
0
3
 Q
4
0
4
 Q
1
0
4
 Q
2
0
4
 Q
3
0
4
 Q
4
0
5
 Q
1
0
5
 Q
2
0
5
 Q
3
0
5
 Q
4
0
6
 Q
1
0
6
 Q
2
0
6
 Q
3
0
6
 Q
4
Per cent
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Per cent
Original Corrected
Apart from higher taxes, regulatory measures were
introduced for stricter rules in connection with the control of
tax payments, which also had the capacity to generate a
major impact on the labour market, particularly on regular
wages. These measures were designed to combat pretended
contracts, and for the whitening of wages and employment in
general, becoming relevant as of the second half of 2006. The
impacts of these measures on wage dynamics are also
addressed in the box above. However, according to our
estimates this effect, namely whitening, cannot be held fully
accountable for the strong dynamics of regular wages, as it
also remains high after filtering out the impacts of whitening
(see chart in box).
The chart above also illustrates this phenomenon, which is
clearly showing up in the relation between wage dynamics
(with the impacts of wage pressure, forward payments and
whitening filtered out) and productivity which has remained
well lower than wage dynamics in recent years. In this
respect, there is a substantial deviation between the
manufacturing industry and the market services sector. In
spite of the fact that in manufacturing productivity easily
surpasses the unit labour costs, which are still negative, but
which show signs of a slight increase in recent months, the
cost of labour has been rising rapidly among services, which
appear to dominate the dynamics of the private sector, and
this gradually degrades profitability in conjunction with
decreasing productivity. In turn, this has the capacity to drive
prices up in the future, and thereby causing inflation
pressure.
20
The situation is better in the manufacturing
industry, however, it too has some negative elements,
notably, if wages fail to follow the downward trend of
productivity – due, for example, to the impact of skill
mismatch resulting in weak supply on the labour market –
some tightness may occur in this sector as well, resulting in
inflationary risks.
In the November Report we outlined two scenarios. We are
still not certain as to which one is more applicable based on
the information available at this time. According to one
scenario, some economic agents will handle the tax measures
as a simple shock, and if the workers have bargaining power
at wage agreements (and the tightening of the labour market,
as explained above, points in this direction), they will adapt
in 2006 to a somewhat higher nominal path, by way of
bonuses offered as a welfare compensation. Although this
may be incorporated into regular wages during 2007 – as a
one-off change –, such one-off adaptation will merely result
in temporary wage pressure over the short term. On the other
hand, in the second scenario, agents increase their inflation
expectations, which could be incorporated over the long run
into the growth rate of regular wages and cause inflation
pressure. Nevertheless, we are still uncertain as to which of
these two scenarios apply, however, based on the
information we have received since November we feel that
the first – and more favourable – version is more likely.
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Chart 2-18
Labour cost and productivity in the private sector 
(seasonally adjusted quarterly data, including the impacts of whitening
and forward payments of bonuses, annual growth rates)
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Chart 2-19
Average gross real wages and productivity in the
manufacturing industry and in the market services
sector
(seasonally adjusted quarterly data, series adjusted with the impacts of
whitening and forward payments of bonuses, annual growth rates – see box)
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20 Downsizing could be an alternative solution for deteriorating profitability, of which we have seen no signs yet in institutional statistics, however, in the labour market
survey the shift toward workforce reduction could be an indication of such.
Although, the actual data on earnings is higher than we
predicted, there is no sign in the consumer price index for the
first quarter of 2007 of any higher expectations, whereas the
data from February concerning wages indicate slower wage
dynamics, and a possible turning point. Another important
indicator is found in the survey of the Hay Group for wage
increases during 2007, where the companies surveyed
declared that they will offer some compensation to their
employees in connection with the higher costs of living (see
box text below).
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21 The questionnaire inquires about the increases in regular wages and fixed bonuses.
22 See Box 2-2 pertaining to our assessment of whitening.
The Hay Group, a consulting firm, regularly conducts surveys among
large corporations concerning the driving forces in their wage policies.
The purpose of the survey is to provide information to the participating
companies concerning developments in their market environment (of
course, only at the aggregate level: none of the companies have access
to information specific to a particular company). For this very reason it
is vital for the consultant to ensure that the information supplied is
authentic and reliable; any company supplying false information could
even be excluded from further exchange of information.
Firms participating in the sample are typically large, multinational
companies. The sectoral breakdown essentially covers the whole
Hungarian private sector. During the 2000-2007 period under review,
60 to 100 companies replied to the questions on average. The average
participant has a workforce of 1,000-1,200 persons and a net annual
revenue of HUF 30-80 billion. Consequently, the model can not be
considered representative as pertaining to the Hungarian economy on
the whole, it is able to provide a reliable view of an important segment
nonetheless.
In this brief study we would like to convey some conclusions of the
survey as regards wage policies. The Hay Group asks the participating
companies on a yearly basis about their estimated and planned schedule
of wage increases, and about the ratio these wages represent in
connection with work performance, or with any compensation provided
in connection with the costs of living and any surge in inflation.
The chart below indicates the annual growth rate in the gross average
earnings in the private sector as published by the CSO, and the annual
average wage increases in the corporations participating in the Hay
Group survey,21 including the two major components, notably the
performance factor and the inflation/costs of living factor. The years
covered do not coincide with the calendar years, for the consultant firm
commonly approaches the participating companies during the middle
of the year. The data pertaining to 2007 was gathered this February,
concerned with the wage increases scheduled and/or actually
implemented between May 2006 and April 2007. It is important to point
out that, according to the answers supplied, the majority of companies
decides on wages on maximum two occasions each year, one of which
almost always takes place in January. Accordingly, the data for 2007
already contains the most important wage increase for this year among
the companies interviewed.
We wish to emphasise four important facts about the chart: (1) The
wage dynamics shown in the Hay Group survey are systematically
lower what is indicated in the CSO data. (2) The difference, however, is
constant over time, meaning that the results of the survey clearly
reflect the turning points seen in the official statistics. (3) As for the
various components, the inflation/costs of living factor leads the way,
as it provides the variability of the series. (4) The wage dynamics
returning to a growing path in 2007 is the result of the inflation
component.
All this may be an indication that the reason behind the higher wage
dynamics seen in recent months is either the one-off compensation for
the higher costs of living or the rise in inflation expectations. For this
reason, among others, in the baseline path of our forecast published in
the Report we assumed that the rise in wage dynamics seen in the CSO
data is a mainly real (meaning that “whitening” is not the only cause
behind it22), but rather only one-off compensation from the firms for the
higher costs of living for their employees. However, it cannot be ruled
out that the rise in inflation expectations also have a role, therefore, in
the risk distribution of our fan chart higher wage dynamics plays an
important role.
Box 2-3: A survey on corporate wage policies
Chart 2-20
Wage surveys, Hay Group and CSO
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Note: The years covered do not coincide with the calendar years, as
they start in the following months: 2000: from the previous
September, 2001-2003: from the previous July, 2004-2007: from the
previous May. CSO data is available up to February of 2007.
In the first quarter of 2007, the consumer price index stood
at 8.5 per cent, while core inflation was at 5.8 per cent
following the adjustment for the visitation fee, constituting a
rise 2.2 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively, compared to
the previous quarter. The high index of the first quarter is
attributed mainly to the substantial increase of regulated
prices at the end of last summer and then again this year, and
the impact of higher VAT rates spilling over from September
2006.
As far as core inflation is concerned, the annualised quarterly
index shows a decline compared to the second half of 2006,
however, in terms of the overall level it is higher than during
the period between 2005 and the middle of 2006.
23
At the
same time, trend inflation in the first quarter is surrounded
by a great deal of uncertainty. On the whole, we feel that the
persistent component of inflation at this time was between 3
to 5 per cent, in all likelihood closer to the higher limit (see
box below).
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2.3. Inflation trends
Chart 2-21
Consumer price index and core inflation
(yearly changes)
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23 The April consumer price index shows further rapid decrease relatively to the past quarter. Because the moderation was influenced by some particular items, we
consider the tendency temporary, and thus our views on trend inflation have remained unchanged.
24 From the CPI items the core inflation index does not contain unprocessed foods, fuels, energy and products with regulated prices. The index calculated by the MNB
differs from the core inflation indicator of the CSO, due to the filtering of impacts induced by tax changes, and also to the fact that the MNB (on account of limited
availability of data) remains behind the CSO in terms of accuracy in connection with products with regulated prices.
With a view to preparing a trend inflation series, the MNB compiles a
core inflation series to filter out the impacts of tax rate changes.24 The
quarterly (seasonally unadjusted, annualised) index produced in this
fashion stood at 4.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2007. Additionally,
the series has to be seasonally adjusted with a view to determining
trend inflation. However, the seasonal effect of the series have changed
in recent years, and this has a substantial impact on the estimated value
of trend inflation. Changes in the seasonal effect is not limited to
Hungary, as throughout the EU and in some of the neighbouring
countries, price cuts at the beginning of the year and also during the
summer are becoming more and more popular.
The chart above calls attention to the speed of changes in the seasonal
effect and to the uncertainty in the projection of trend inflation on
account of changes in the seasonal effect. If we were to calculate the
seasonal effect based on the entire time spectrum (1999 Q1 – 2007 Q1),
the estimated value of trend inflation comes to 4.9 per cent, meaning
that it is higher than the original unadjusted index. This comes as a
surprise as Hungarian series traditionally show greater price increases at
the beginning of each year, in other words, we were expecting the
seasonally adjusted index at least not to be higher than the original
value.
If we were to determine the seasonal effect of the series relying on the
periods before 2003 only (in other words, we were to presume the
history of massive price hikes in January to continue), the estimated
value of trend inflation for the first quarter of 2007 is 2.8 per cent.
However, such adjustment is almost certain to underestimate trend
inflation as the changes in seasonal effect appear well substantiated in
light of the partial aggregates. Furthermore, the chart above clearly
illustrates that if the series is adjusted in this fashion, it contained
Box 2-4: Where did trend inflation stand during the first quarter?
Chart 2-22
Core inflation adjustments
(annualized quarterly changes)
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Unchanged trend in market services
In the case of market services the trend remained unchanged.
The index showing annualised monthly changes, with the
effect of VAT rate changes and visitation fee filtered out,
remained in the 6–8 per cent range. Presumably, this trend is
attributed to the massive increase in wage costs and to
stagnating productivity, which, on the other hand, could
emerge in the future in the form of price pressure on the cost
side.
Contradicting trends among the segments of core
inflation involved in international trade
As for other segments of core inflation, analysis is rendered
difficult by the fact that there are no excessive figures at the
quarterly level, the path appears to be just the opposite of
our projections at the monthly level. Furthermore, while
some items turned out as expected, the price development of
other products significantly differ from path explained by
previous trends. Following the January figures, which were
particularly favourable, the prices of industrial products and
processed foods were climbing rapidly and incessantly,
whereas in the partial segments of products in foreign trade
the trend is different.
As for processed foods, we have identified additional price
increases during the quarter, that are deemed consistent with
regional tendencies. Presumably, the price increase in
unprocessed foods also play a role in the continued climb of
the index of processed foods.
While deflation continued among durable goods, the prices of
non-durable goods kept on rising during the quarter. The result
of these two impacts was a moderate price increase among
industrial products. As far as durable goods are concerned, the
stronger forint exchange rate could be the reason behind
deflation, while the higher prices of non-durables are attributed
to individual items among others.
25
As the prices remain higher
even with these individual items isolated, this product category
appears to be immune for the time being from the impact of the
higher forint exchange rate spilling over.
In our view, the most realistic explanation for this
phenomenon can be the following. During the increase of
VAT in September of 2006 market participants decided to
bring forward part of their planned price increases, and –
contrary to the former seasonality – implemented the
remaining part in the second half of 2007 Q2. The sharp
increases seen in September and October appear to support
this argument, as well as the lower indices until February
2007.
26
The weak side of this argument, however, is that the
findings of the study conducted to assess the impacts of the
2004 VAT increase do not support the hypothesis of price
increases being brought forward. We do not have sufficient
INFLATION TRENDS
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Chart 2-24
Inflation in market services and unit labour costs
(yearly changes)
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25 The non-durable goods with the highest price increases are: clothing items, coffee, home repair goods and soft drinks.
26 Among other things, this could also be reason for the changes in the seasonal effect of core inflation, that is addressed in detail in the box below.
residual negative seasonal effects in the first quarter of recent years, in
other words it tends to underestimate trend inflation in the first
quarters. On account of the uncertainty factor in the projections, trend
inflation cannot be accurately determined for the first quarter of 2007,
as it was somewhere between 3 to 5 per cent, potentially closer to the
upper boundary of this range.
information to decide whether this process is temporary or
long lasting, and therefore we will have to wait for
information in the months ahead.
27
Items outside of core inflation point towards higher
inflation
During the quarter substantial increases were implemented in
regulated prices. While price increases in imported energy
weakly reflected in household prices in former years, energy
prices now rose considerably due to the reduction of subsidies.
The price of district heating went up by 30 per cent, the price
of gas by 22.5 per cent and electricity by 5.3 per cent. Due to
a change in the subsidy system, prices of pharmaceutical
products rose in January and February, approximately by 20
per cent on aggregate. However, let us point out that in
March the price of natural gas and central heating showed
some decline, due to the subsidies awarded by that time. 
The price index of motor fuels declined during the quarter on
account of low oil prices. Prices of market energy products
did not change, in other words, they did not keep up with the
changes in regulated prices, presumably because in this case
the rate of subsidy was changed, while the price of the
product did not.
As for unprocessed foods we have identified two contrasting
impacts. On the one hand, the price of pork dropped
considerably compared to the previous quarter, while on the
other hand the price of potatoes remained extremely high,
which is consistent with regional tendencies.
Lower inflation expectations on the part of
households
In terms of inflation expectations we see some positive
changes. The index showing expectations for 12 months ahead
is now declining after reaching an all-time high during the last
quarter, although it is still considered extremely high. Thus, the
risk of an increase in forward-looking inflation expectations
still could not be ruled out over the forecast horizon. Inflation
measured over the last 12 months is still high, presumably due
for the most part to the government measures implemented
recently, and to the significant increases in regulated prices.
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Chart 2-25
Inflation of industrial goods
(annualised monthly changes)
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Household inflation expectations
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27 There could be other hypothesises in connection with the prices of non-durable goods. One is that the prices of non-durables went up throughout the region in
general principle (European imported inflation trends etc.). However, we did not find such correlation between Hungarian and regional non-durable goods. 
3. Outlook for inflation 
and the real economy

According to the main scenario of our forecast, the impacts
of the demand and cost shocks resulting from the fiscal
measures will eventually fade, and by 2008 and 2009, instead
of one-off impacts, gradually the supply and demand
conditions in the goods and the labour markets will be the
driving force behind inflation and economic growth. Based
on the most recent data our macroeconomic projection has
cleared up somewhat: the duality resulting from the
difference between internal and external demand continues
to characterise economic activity over the short run, while
there are signs in the labour market indicating that the faster
wage growth may reflect a one-off compensation for the
decline in real wages. On the other hand, uncertainty relating
to inflation expectations continues to prevail.
Our main scenario for 2007 and 2008 did not change
significantly as far as the outlook for inflation and economic
growth is concerned, and this is our first forecast for 2009.
The output gap remains negative over the entire forecast
horizon, while inflation will be on a downward path from the
second quarter, after reaching its peak during the first quarter
of 2007, and is expected to approach the mid-term inflation
target at the five to eight quarters monetary policy horizon.
The main scenario of our forecast is built on the assumption
of anchored inflation expectations, while the impact of a
possible co-ordination problem appears in the distribution of
risks.
Goods market: negative output gap over the
forecast horizon
The growth rate of Hungarian economy will remain below
potential over our entire forecast horizon. After the low in
2007, the growth rate could accelerate in 2008 and 2009 to
approach its potential, but the output gap is projected to
remain negative throughout. The internal and external
components of growth are expected to rebalance as the
impacts of fiscal adjustment measures on internal demand
continue to diminish; the role of net export gradually fades
and, simultaneously, the importance of consumption
expenditure and investments grows.
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Consistent with the practice followed over a longer period, the staff of
the MNB have produced a conditional macroeconomic projection.
Accordingly, monthly averages for April have been used for the
following variables: the EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange rates; the
MNB’s base rate and long-term interest rates; and April’s average futures
price for Brent crude oil. Interest expenses, estimated on the basis of the
market yield curve, have been used in the calculation of the budget
deficit. The 2007 Budget Act, the convergence programme and official
government announcements have been used to derive an estimate for
the effect of government measures. In addition to these, another
assumption for the central projection has been that inflation
expectations are anchored around the 3 per cent inflation target.
Macroeconomic information received up to the end of the day on 11
May 2007 has been incorporated in the forecast.
Box 3-1 Assumptions underlying the central projection
Table 3-1
Changes to the assumptions relative to February*
February 2007 Current
2007 2008 2007 2008 2009
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
EUR/HUF exchange rate 253.8 253.8 247.6 246.0 246.0
ESD/EUR exchange rate (cent) 130.0 130.0 134.0 135.0 135.0
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 57.2 60.7 65.8 70.3 69.6
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 11,157 11,846 12,132 12,797 12,685
* Annual averages, based on the monthly average exchange rate in October 2006 and the crude oil futures price.
** End-of-year values.
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External economic activity is expected to remain
strong
In respect of exports we expect dynamic growth on
account of strong external economic activity, as the major
confidence indicators (IFO, EABCI) suggest robust growth
in external demand. Foreign trade data from the beginning
of 2007 show extraordinary growth in exports and a sharp
increase in import growth, which is somewhat
contradictory to our projection for weaker internal
demand, yet it is consistent with our view relating to the
turning point of investment dynamics. There is a risk
factor, however, insofar as the relative decline of market
share, calculated at current prices compared to competitors
in the region, suggests problems in terms of price
competitiveness.
28
In consequence of the above, we expect to see positive
growth contribution on the net export side over the entire
forecast horizon, which will, however, diminish over time in
line with the increasing growth of internal demand. While in
2007 net exports are expected to be the driving force behind
economic growth, by 2009 the contribution of this factor will
be close to neutral.
29
A turning point in investments 
After the decline in the volume of investments during the last
three quarters of 2006, we expect a trend reversal in the first
half of 2007, which may be followed over the next two years
by moderate, but accelerating growth. High capacity utilisation
also suggests a turning point, as well as foreign trade volume,
reflected by strong machinery imports in early 2007, which are
principally considered to be for investment purposes and a
rebound in production in the construction industry. However,
the expansion in investment dynamics may be somewhat
moderate compared to previous upturns in business activity. As
indicted by the data of previous years, the response of
exporting companies to external economic activity in terms of
new investments is weaker than in previous periods.
30
The number of new building permits suggests that the real
estate investments of households are expected to increase after
the second half of 2008. As the utilisation of EU funds is
expected to grow, it supports our projection for a moderate, but
positive expansion in investment dynamics at the national level.
Slowdown in the decline of incomes, consumption
smoothing
The demand-reducing impact of the fiscal adjustment
measures will be the strongest in 2007, resulting in a decline
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28 See in details our box in chapter 2.1.
29 As we already indicated in the previous chapter, there is a great deal of methodological uncertainty in connection with imports and with its contribution to growth. 
30 As discussed in previous analyses (see, for example, Analysis of convergence, December 2006), as far as corporate investments are concerned, structural problems
may occur. Consequently, there is good chance to presume that investments will be less sensitive to favourable external economic activity.
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Chart 3-3
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of household incomes. Households will partially adapt to this
through their consumption expenses and by smoothing their
consumption over time. The consumption expenditures of
households is expected to fall back at a rate lower than the
reduction in disposable income, which will be covered from
their net financial assets, either through a decline in their
financial savings or from growing indebtedness. As suggested
by actual data on consumption and income, and also by
forecasts, consumption smoothing already started during the
second half of 2006: during the second half of the year
households did not cut back on consumption expenditures
due to their loss of real income in response to the
government measures. We expect that during the 2007–2009
period household consumption will decline initially, and then
it will regain momentum and even surpass the level we have
indicated in our previous forecasts. This can be explained by
higher wages and transfers of subsidies projected as a result
of compensation by employers for the decline in real wages
due to inflation.
Labour market: temporary surge in wages, lower
labour demand and activity
Higher wage path under the assumption of anchored
expectations
Our wage path projection adopted under the presumption of
anchored inflation expectations is built on the principle that
the high wage dynamics conveyed in the actual data indicate
temporary, but realistic growth for the most part (see the box
on the subject of whitening in the previous Chapter). As
regards the private sector, higher dynamics result in loss of
profits, which the companies affected are expected to counter
through lower future wage dynamics and through the
reduction of employment. In our main scenario – on account
of lower internal demand – we presume that the price
pressure induced by the loss of profit will only be moderate.
In consequence of the above, the dynamics reflected in the
nominal wage path could be consistent with the mid-term
inflation target by the end of the forecast horizon, however,
at the same time, it represents an upward risk factor if
inflation expectations are not anchored as we have predicted. 
In the private sector – relying on the latest data available – we
expect to see the wage path rise in the early stages of the
forecast horizon, however, it is projected to embark on a
downward path from the second half of 2007. We have
examined three possibilities – including two extreme
scenarios – which could explain the higher wage dynamics
reflected in the actual data, which are of key importance
from the perspective of the forecast as well.
According to one of the extreme scenarios, the sole reason
behind the rising trend of wages during the last half-year
period is the whitening of the labour market. Accordingly,
the exceptional wage dynamics seen in recent months is
reduced to a statistical phenomena, without any significant
wage pressure to speak of. The other extreme scenario views
the surge in wages as a lasting process, and includes less
anchored inflation expectations as the reason.
We did not include either of the above two extreme scenarios
in the main scenario. As we have shown in Chapter 2.2, the
process of whitening in the economy cannot be the reason for
the recent surge in wages in itself. As far as the anchoring of
inflation expectations is concerned, the high wage dynamics
and the relatively moderate price dynamics seen in the
market services sector suggest, even though the data received
thus far still appear to be insufficient, any problem in
anchoring of inflation expectations is less likely, although it
remains a possible option nonetheless. In line with the above,
surveys continue to support high inflation expectations,
although latest data refers to some correction. We have
shown the uncertainty relating to expectations in the
distribution of risks contained in the forecast.
In the main scenario of wage projection we worked on the
assumption that the initially high growth rate of wages is
realistic, but only temporary, because it reflects
compensation to workers for the decline in real wages. This
latter scenario is supported by several factors. The survey of
the Hay Group on large companies (see box 2-3 in the
previous Chapter) suggests that employers will offer some
compensation to their employees in connection with the
higher costs of living, however, this concept is obscured by
the fact that according to the results of the survey, the
possibility of wage increases consistent with higher inflation
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expectations cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, the
apparent break in the rise of labour market activity and the
simultaneous stagnation in the number of jobs benefit the
bargaining position of employees at the macro level.
In harmony with the above, after the high growth rate seen in
2007, according to the main scenario of our forecast wage
dynamics in the private sector will gradually return to a lower
level between 6 to 7 per cent by 2009. On the other hand, it is
important to point out that the unit labour cost path is
considerably different over the entire forecast horizon in the
manufacturing industry and in the market services sector,
despite the similar wage dynamics. According to the main
scenario of our forecast, productivity growth will be consistent
with the rise in wages in the manufacturing industry, which will
result in moderate price-setting along a favourable profit path.
On the other hand, as far as market services are
concerned, the significant slowdown in the growth rate of
productivity results in steady labour cost pressure, which
in turn will cause the prices of services to decline at a
slower pace, in spite of sluggish internal demand, and this
will be felt in the adjustment of wages and in the lower
number of jobs. The possibility of a slower-than-expected
decline in wage dynamics in this sector – which could
force companies to increase prices at a faster pace than
indicated in the main scenario – represents an upward risk
to inflation.
As far as wage dynamics in the public sector are concerned,
we continued to rely on the figures contained in the
convergence programme, but we also took into
consideration the OKÉT agreement concluded at the
beginning of 2007. Consequently, according to our
forecast the payment of wages in the public sector will
diminish somewhat by 2007–2009, and settle at around 
3 per cent as a trend value; however, we also foresee
increasing uncertainty for 2009.
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Chart 3-5
Components of unit labour costs in 
the manufacturing industry*
(compared to the same quarter of the previous year)
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Chart 3-6
Components of unit labour costs in the market
services sector*
(compared to the same quarter of the previous year)
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Table 3-2
Wage projection on a national level
2006 2007 2008 2009
Private sector
Average wage 9.5 8.6 7.1 6.3
Unit labour cost 5.8 5.9 4.6 3.2
Public sector*
Average wage 6.4 2.7 3.1 0.9
National economy
Average wage 8.7 7.3 6.3 5.0
* Based on CSO cash-flow data, accrual-based data as estimated by MNB and forecast, adjusted by carrying 13th month wages over to another year.
Looser labour market with question marks
In 2007, we expect the number of employed to decline in the
wake of the fiscal adjustment measures, and it should then
level out in 2008 and 2009. Simultaneously, supply in the
labour market is also expected to drop gradually, due mostly
to conjunctural reasons. As we explained in Chapter 2.2, the
labour market data from the previous four months suggest
that some of the workers who lost their jobs will withdraw
directly to inactivity. In our projection we assume that the
level of activity declines somewhat on the forceast horizon.
Restrictions in retirement policy however counteract to a
more pronounced decline. 
The magnitude of withdrawals from the labour market
generates uncertainty in determining the prospective degree
of tightness in the labour market. If this process becomes
permanent, the decline in employment will result in a lesser
amount of loosening in the labour market leading to more
persistent wage inflation pressures.
Inflation gradually approaches the medium-term
objective
Overall, the main scenario of inflation has not changed
significantly relative to our latest forecast. Nevertheless, we
expect the disinflationary process to slow down to some
extent. The main scenario of our forecast assumes that
inflation expectations are anchored by the medium term
inflation target. This assumption is supported by the fact that
price dynamics remained relatively moderate at the time of
more than 10 per cent wage increase seen in the market
services sector. At the same time, the findings of surveys of
inflation expectations call for caution, even though –
according to the latest information – they indicate declining
expectations among the households after the recent historic
highs.
According to our forecasts, inflation will reach its peak
during the first quarter of 2007, after which it will gradually
return to the medium-term inflation target as the impact of
fiscal measures manifested in higher prices eventually fade.
After the rate of 7.3 per cent in 2007, the annual average rate
of inflation will be 3.6 per cent in 2008 and 2.8 per cent in
2009. The difference between the annual average of core
inflation and the consumer price index in 2008 is explained
by the more than 5 per cent hike in regulated prices
(including the predicted 20 per cent increase in gas prices),
while in 2009 it is explained by our technical assumption –
concerning forward oil prices – in terms of motor fuels and
market energy prices.
The key factors in the core inflation process on the cost side
(energy prices, wages) would suggest a prolonged and slowly
declining inflation path, however, in the short run the stricter
monetary conditions introduced during the last half-year
period allow inflation to drop slightly faster, while during
2008 and 2009 the impact of expectations that were deemed
anchored in the main scenario, and the delayed
disinflationary effect of the negative output gap will be
dominant.
Forecasting uncertainty
The main scenario of our inflation forecast is surrounded by
two-sided but – on the whole – upside risks. The upside risks
originate mostly from uncertainty factors on the cost side,
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Chart 3-7
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Table 3-3
Inflation forecast main scenario
2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Core inflation 6.4 6.8 5.6 4,3 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0
Consumer price index 8.5 8.7 6.9 5,0 4.1 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8
Core inflation, annual 
average 5.7 3.4 3.1
Consumer price index, 
annual average 7.3 3.6 2.8
including, first and foremost, less strongly anchored inflation
expectations. The uncertainty factors on the demand side –
the larger-than-expected disinflationary effect of the
slowdown in the economy – indicate downside risks,
although to a lesser degree.
The demand and cost side uncertainty factors surrounding
the GDP forecast main scenario resulted, on the aggregate, in
symmetrical risk distribution.
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Chart 3-8
Inflation forecast fan chart
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4. Background information 
and balance

Our view on basic inflationary trends has not changed
considerably relative to the February update of the full-
fledged November Report, although developments in the
labour market do appear less favourable as far as inflation
is concerned. Nevertheless, we did not incorporate our
dilemma in connection with the latter fully into the
baseline scenario, due to the inevitable adjustment of the
corporate sector, we expect fast moderation of wage
dynamics. We consider any potentially sustained
acceleration in wage dynamics as a risk factor for the time
being.
31
In line with our previous opinion and with the February
Report, after inflation reaches its peak during the first half
2007 as expected, the consumer price index will gradually
return to the mid-term inflation target. However, for 2007
we foresee only a slightly lower inflation, compared to
February, and the rate of decline will slow further down
subsequently. In this Chapter we look into the factors behind
the difference between our current forecast as compared to
the forecast update published in February.
According to our current forecast, inflation is expected to peak
in 2007 a little below previous levels; therefore, the annual
average growth rate of consumer prices is 7.3 per cent in our
baseline scenario, and then inflation will slow down and drop
to 3.6 per cent in 2008. In early 2009, the rate of increase in
consumer prices is projected to reach the 3 per cent inflation
rate at the one-and-half-two-year horizon relevant for monetary
policy. The somewhat different path of inflation is attributed to
changes in our key assumptions and in our view on the world,
prompted by information on macroeconomic developments.
Regarding our assumptions, the rule-based assumption we
have made for the forint exchange rate is 3 per cent
(February: 254, May: EUR/HUF 246), in consequence of
which our forecast for 2007 and 2008 turned out somewhat
lower due to import prices.
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4.1. Background information to our projections
31 Macroeconomic information received up to the end of the day on 11 May 2007 has been incorporated in the forecast.
Table 4-1
Key factors behind the difference in the current forecast relative to the February Report
2007 2008
Import prices  
Regulated prices  
Oil price movements*  
Labour market developments 
Unprocessed food prices  
Total  
* Not incorporating the effect on regulated prices.
Table 4-2
Changes in our main assumptions relative to the February update of the Report*
February 2007 Actual
2007 2008 2007 2008 2009
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
EUR/HUF exchange rate 253.8 253.8 247.6 246.0 246.0
EUR/USD exchange rate (US cents) 130.0 130.0 134.0 135.0 135.0
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 57.2 60.7 65.8 70.3 69.6
Brent oil prices (HUF/barrel) 11,157 11,846 12,132 12,797 12,685
* Annual averages, based on the average exchange rate of April 2007, or on the forward oil price path.
** Year-end figures.
On the other hand, our latest projection for global oil prices
in euro – which directly affects motor fuel prices and market
energy prices – is decisively higher than in February. This
factor -together with regulated gas and district heating price
changes as a consequence – causes inflation to be 0.3
percentage points higher in 2007, and 0.4 percentage points
higher in 2008.
32
Changes in our predictions pertaining to other regulated
prices point towards lower inflation in 2007. It covers the
impact generated by price movements of pharmaceutical
products which were below expectations, and the fact that
more households are applying for gas price compensation.
However
The inflation data received since the February Report hardly
had any impact on our forecast. CPI in the first quarter of
2007 was 0.1 percentage points below our November
forecast, while core inflation for the same period was 0.1
percentage points above our projection. The higher prices of
certain unprocessed foodstuff (potatoes, fruits) also increased
the forecast.
As regards our forecast concerning the labour market, in
February we were uncertain about several factors. In
connection with the high wage dynamics shown in the
actual data we were unable to determine the role played by
the whitening of the economy, the impact of (one-off)
compensation for the costs of living, and effect of the
increase in inflation expectations. Upon analysing the data
received since then, we have come to the conclusion (see the
first Box in Chapter 2.2) that the impact of whitening, even
though it can be measured, cannot be the only reason
behind higher wage dynamics. Furthermore, as the
questionnaire-based survey conducted by the Hay Group
indicates, companies plan to implement higher wage
increases in 2007 than in the previous year, claiming the
higher costs of living as the main reason (see the second box
text in Chapter 2.2.).
The outlook on economic growth is dominated by changes in
two key factors. On the one hand, we expect exports to grow
faster due to a better-than-expected external economic
activity. However, since imports also turned out better than
projected, our forecast for net exports did not vary
considerably on account of the favourable external economic
activity.
Simultaneously, higher wages and cash transfers increase our
forecast for household consumption. The data received
indicate somewhat lower consumption than what we
expected, and the higher payments of wages mainly result in
an increase in our forecast for 2008. Therefore, all things
considered, in our opinion this year the economy will slow
down consistent with our February update, while we have
slightly raised our forecast for GDP growth next year, due
mostly to the higher-than-expected growth rate of
consumption.
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Chart 4-1
Changes in our core inflation forecast
(annual changes)
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32 A box in the August 2004 issue of the Report contained an analysis of the effects of oil price movements on the Hungarian economy. As was discussed in detail, an
increase of 10 per cent in oil prices raises the consumer price level by around 0.4 per cent, if rises in the costs of imported energy are built into administered prices.
In general, however, household energy prices are likely to increase at a more rapid pace than import costs in the period ahead, given that gas price subsidies have
fallen recently and the compensation fund is expected to be reduced looking forward. However, as our view of the domestic subsidy system has remained broadly
constant, the change in the projection for administered prices since February reflects exclusively movements in the costs of imported energy, consistent with the
analysis in the August 2004 Report.
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The impacts of an alternative interest and exchange rate path
We examined the impact on our forecast if we were to use
the April Reuters survey and rely on the exchange and
interest rate expectations it contains for the inflation forecast.
Compared to the projections made in the base forecast,
according to analysts by the end of 2007 and for the
following two years the exchange rate will be 1.9 per cent
lower (EUR/HUF 251), while in the case of central bank base
rate they predict a cut of 100 basis points by the end of 2007,
and another 100 basis points by the end of 2008. Applying
these presumptions for the purposes of our forecast, they will
result in an increase of 0.1 percentage point in the annual
average consumer prices index for 2007, and an increase of
0.2 and 0.1 percentage point in inflation for 2008 and 2009,
respectively. The change in the growth rate for GDP would
be a less, notably, an increase of 0.1 percentage point for next
year and a half of a percentage point for 2009.
Comparing our forecast to the projections of other institutions
As far as inflation is concerned, for 2007 most international
institutions – whose latest forecasts were prepared several
months ago – predicted lower rates than MNB, whereas the
average of analysts prognosis surveyed by Reuters in April
hardly differs from that of the MNB. On the other hand, for
2008 the MNB forecast is among the lower figures, but still
within the rates projected by the analysts.
Our view on economic growth for 2007–2008 is similar to
that of the majority of forecasters. In our opinion the current
account deficit in 2007 will be lower than predicted by most
international forecasters, while the median of the Reuters
survey is the same as the MNB forecast. As for 2008, there is
no considerable difference among the various forecasts. As
far as the general government deficit is concerned, MNB
takes a positive stand for both years as regards the ESA-95
deficit indicators.
Chart 4-2
Exchange rate path according to the Reuters survey
conducted in April and under the presumption of a
fixed exchange rate*
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Chart 4-3
Central bank base rate path according to the Reuters
survey conducted in April and under the
presumption of a fixed interest rate
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Table 4-3
Changes in our forecasts compared to February 2007
2006 2007 2008 2009
Projection
Actual February*** Current February*** Current February*** Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation1 2.4 5.6 5.7 3.3 3.4 x 3.1
Consumer price index 3.9 7.4 7.3 3.4 3.6 x 2.8
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 3.8 2.5 3.0 2.2 2.4 x 2.4
Impact of fiscal demand2 0.8 x -3.4 x -1.7 x -0.4
Household consumption 1.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.5 0.6 x 1.8
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 1.5 x -0.6 x 1.2 x 2.2
Fixed capital formation -1.8 2.3 2.3 4.3 4.6 x 5.9
Domestic absorption* 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.6 1.7 x 3.2
Export 18.0 12.1 15.3 10.2 11.8 x 9.5
Import*3 12.6 9.4 12.2 9.0 10.7 x 9.4
GDP 3.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.8 x 3.4
Current account deficit3
As a percentage of GDP* 5.8  (5.5) 4.7  4.3 4.4 x 4.2
EUR billions* 5.2  (5.2) 4.9  4.3 4.9 x 4.9
External financing requirement3
As a percentage of GDP 5.0  (4.1) 3.3  2.6 2.3 x 1.8
Labour market
Whole-economy gross average earnings4 8.7 x 7.2 x 6.2 x 5.0
Whole-economy employment5 0.6 x -0.6 x -0.1 x 0.1
Private sector gross average earnings 9.5  (7.3) 8.6  (7.0) 7.1 x 6.3
Private sector employment5 1.3  (0.3) 0.0 (0.5) 0.1 x 0.1
Private sector unit labour cost 5.8 x 5.9 x 4.6 x 3.2
Household real income 0.1**  (-3.8) -2.8  (1.7) 2.3 x 2.3
1 
For technical reasons, the indicator that we project may temporarily differ from the index published by the CSO; over the longer term, however, it
follows a similar trend. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
As a result of uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics, from 2004 actual current account deficit and external financing requirement
may be higher than suggested by official figures or our projections based on such figures. 
4
Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 
5
According to the CSO labour
force survey.
* Our projection includes the impact of the Gripen purchase, which raises the current account deficit and increases community consumption and
imports.
** MNB estimate.
***The arrows indicate the direction of changes installed in the February update compared to the November forecast.
2007 2008
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2007) 7.3 3.6
Consensus Economics (March 2007)1 6.2–6.9–7.3 3.3–3.7–4.5
OECD (November 2006) 6.7 4.1
European Commission (Spring 2007) 7.5 3.8
IMF (April 2007) 6.4 3.8
Reuters-survey (April 2007)1 6.3–7.2 –7.7 3.2–3.6–4.0
World Bank (January 2007) 6.2 -
GDP (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2007) 2.5 2.8
Consensus Economics (March 2007)1 1.8–2.4–3.0 2.4–3.0–3.7
OECD (November 2006) 2.2 3.0
European Commission (Spring 2007) 2.4 2.6
IMF (April 2007) 2.8 3.0
Reuters-survey (April 2007)1 2.2–2.5–2.8 2.8–3.1–3.6
World Bank (January 2007) 2.2 -
Current account deficit (billion EUR/USD)
MNB (May 2007) (EUR) 4.9 4.9
Consensus Economics (March 2007)1 (USD) 4.6–6.5–7.5 4.0–6.3–8.2
Reuters-survey (April 2007)1 (EUR) 4.2–4.9–6.0 3.6–4.7–6.4
Current account deficit (percent of GDP)
MNB (May 2007) 4.73 4.4
OECD (2006. november) 6.3 5.6
European Commission (Autumn 2006) 3.5 2.2
IMF (April 2007) 5.7 4.8
World Bank (January 2007) 5.9 -
Budget Deficit (ESA-95 method. percent of GDP)
MNB (May 2007) 6.0 4.0
Consensus Economics (March 2007)1 6.4–6.8–7.5 3.6–4.7–6.0
European Commission (Spring 2007) 6.8 4.9
Reuters-survey (April 2007)1 5.5–6.4–7.1 3.7–4.5–5.0
World Bank (January 2007) 5.1 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets
MNB (May 2007) 6.8 5.5
OECD (November 2006)2 6.3 7.4
European Commission (Spring 2007)2 8.1 7.3
IMF (April 2007)2 6.3 6.5
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trade partners
MNB (May 2007) 3.0 2.4
OECD (November 2006)2 2.6 2.6
European Commission (Spring 2007)2 3.2 2.9
IMF (April 2007)2 2.8 2.7
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Table 4-4
MNB’s baseline forecast compared to other projections
MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections.
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated for the Reuters
and Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate dispersion. 
2
Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding
individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast may differ
from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions. 
3
Our projection takes account of the negative effect on the current account resulting from the
Gripen fighter procurement.
Source: Consensus Economics Inc. (London), Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (March 2007); European Commission Economic Forecasts, Spring
2007; IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2007); Reuters poll April 2007, World Bank EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (January 2007); OECD
Economic Outlook (November 2006)
According to our forecast, the accrual-based budget deficit
(ESA deficit) could be lower than the deficit target set forth in
the convergence programme of Hungary in 2007 and 2008,
but without additional measures the dynamics of fiscal
adjustment are expected to slowdown in 2009. On account of
the fading dynamics of adjustment, according to our baseline
forecast the deficit for 2009 will be slightly higher than the
Government’s target in the Convergence Programme.
In the beginning, cutting the deficit will definitely depend on
increasing government revenues based on a broader tax base
and higher rates in existing taxes. In the wake of these
measures, 2007 revenues (from taxes and social security
contributions) increased significantly relative to GDP, but
these measures also result in the reduction of tax bases, and
therefore, in lower consumption and less disposable income.
Consequently, government revenues after the initial increase
will begin to decline relative to GDP, in other words, after
2008 the revenue side will cease to be of help in reducing the
budget deficit any further.
33
On the expenditure side, the effects of adjustment will appear
gradually. Of the initial measures, cutting expenditures in the
social security system, decreasing govermnet subsidy schemes
and the wage freeze implemented in the public sector are the
most significant. During the first two years of fiscal adjustment,
apart from the long-term measures outlined for cutting
expenditures, the rapid reduction of, or eliminating the so
called one-off expenditure items (motorway construction,
State Railways (MÁV) capital injection and Gripen fighter
purchases) also have a substantial role in cutting the deficit.
The aggregate impact of the latter items in 2008 is estimated at
1.0 per cent of GDP. Apart from the one-off items, the planned
gradual reduction of the schemes of price subsidies
(pharmaceutical products, gas, public transport, etc.) will also
have long-term effects, and contributes to the reduction of
expenditures over the entire time horizon, and eventually to
stabilising deficit at a lower level. 
The uncertainty in our baseline forecast is high relative to the
historical standards; on the one hand, the uncertainty in
macroeconomic developments is higher than usual,
furthermore, the implementation of measures could be
influenced by the control of the Constitutional Court, as well
as the reaction of the local government system, and the
extent and pace of deficit adjustment measures implemented
by the local authorities.
In our baseline scenario we relied upon the measures
contained in the convergence programme to be carried in full
by 2008–2009, our baseline forecast does not address the
risks of implementation of the measures, as any failure of
implementation of the proposed measures would bring about
a totally different fiscal and macroeconomic path.
QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION • MAY 200748
4.2. Developments in general government
deficit indicators
33 Let us note that the Government’s convergence programme also took this into account.
Preliminary actual Forecast
2006 2007 2008 2009
1) GFS balance -9.4 -6.1 -4.2 -3.8
2) o/w Primary balance -5.6 -2.3 -0.5 -0.2
3) Corrections on ESA basis 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
4) ESA balance (1+3) -9.2 -6.0 -4.0 -3.5
5) Quasi-fiscal expenditure and other adjustments -0.7 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1
6) Augmented (SNA) balance (4+5) -9.9 -6.8 -5.1 -4.6
7) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -6.1 -2.8 -1.2 -0.9
8) Fiscal demand impact 0.8 -3.4 -1.6 -0.3
Memo:
ESA balance as forecast in the Convergence Programme, 10.1 6.8 4.3 3.2
December 2006
Table 4-5
Fiscal deficit indicators 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Government revenues during the 2007–2009 period
The programme for the consolidation of the budget, and the
convergence programme relies heavily during the initial years
of the adjustment period (2006 and 2007) on higher tax and
social security contribution revenues relative to GDP, and on
broader tax base and higher tax rates in existing taxes.
Last year, during the final quarter tax revenues turned out
better than expected. According to the Ministry of Finance,
the most important reason for this increase is the whitening
of the economy. Leaving this route open, we wish to point
out that the higher revenues were less of a surprise according
to our prognosis.
34
At the same time, in our forecast we assumed that extra
revenues in the base year (2007) will begin to decline relative
to GDP due, fundamentally, to tax bases (real wages and
consumption) failing to expand parallel with GDP.
As the growth rate of the private and public consumption in
the years under review is expected to remain below the
growth rate of GDP at current prices, the rate of VAT
revenues relative to GDP will decline by about 0.3 percentage
points in both of those years. According to our
macroeconomic forecast, the growth rate of wages will fall
behind the growth rate of GDP, therefore revenues from
social security contributions and personal income taxes will
also decline by around 0.2 percentage points of GDP over the
next two years.
In the case of corporate taxes, this impact is considerably more
moderate, as we assumed that the growth of corporate profits
will be in tune with the GDP growth rate, whereas in
connection with certain types of corporate taxes (gambling tax,
mining fee, simplified entrepreneurial tax) our projection
indicates that the dynamics of tax revenues will remain behind
the GDP growth rate. As for excise taxes, the tax base of motor
fuels, which comprise the largest segment, is expected to
DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT INDICATORS
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34 As for the details, the general government’s revenues from corporate taxes, excise taxes and social security contributions were higher than projected, revenues from
personal income taxes turned out as expected, while cash-based VAT revenues fell below expectations, whereas accrual-based VAT revenues came close to our
projections.
In the process of making our forecast for the entire period we assumed
that the savings appearing on the expenditure side of the central
government will be spent, however, we also assumed that the
government will use any surplus revenues to reduce the deficit.
We prepared our assessment of the impacts generated by all known
measures intended to increase revenues using our own calculations, in
line with the macroeconomic forecast of the MNB (measures affecting
taxes, tax bases and social security contributions).
As for the measures which were announced but have not yet been
implemented, we assumed that the measures will be carried out as
planned, and that they will have the effect of the magnitude indicated
in the convergence programme.
As for the measures outlined for cutting expenditures, that were
announced and carried out, for most of the open-ended expenditure
items (e.g. pensions; local government investment, etc.) we prepared
our own forecast.
In the case of public wages we assumed that the three-year wage
agreement will be carried out in full. As for the other expenditure items of
government agencies and chapter-administered appropriations we
assumed that they will expand in 2008 and 2009 consistent with changes in
GDP, adjusted by the changes known to us in “extra” one-off expenditure
items (e.g. MÁV capital injection, motorway construction, etc.).
For the interest balance we made our own estimate using the forward
yield curve and the financial plan of ÁKK Rt.
We also relied on the assumption that the new types of taxes that
were introduced as temporary measures will remain in effect until the
end of 2009 (special tax for companies, individuals, and credit
institutions).
In connection with the forecasted financial balance between the
European Union and the Hungarian government we incorporated the
latest forecast published by the Ministry of Finance into our baseline
scenario. Using this forecast, we made our own calculations to
determine the estimated amounts of investments of the general
government, and the estimated costs of co-financing.
As regards the estimated balance of local governments, in the
baseline scenario we assumed the budget (adjustment) cycle to
expire relying on previous experience, and that by the end of the
period the deficit of the sub-sector to return to the usual level at
around 0.2 per cent of GDP. We indicated any potential for higher
deficit among the risk factors.
As for the Budapest metro project we did not incorporate the impact of
financing from European Union resources, which constitutes significant
downside risks.
Box 4-1: Assumptions applied in our forecast
expand only in volume, whereas the excise tax rate of tobacco
products will reach the level required by Community
legislation during the period under review; therefore, the
stable real value of this particular tax revenue cannot be
maintained. Additionally, we do not foresee any further
increase in the level of tax burden for the other types of
taxes. According to our baseline forecast in the next two
years any decline in tax and social security contribution
revenues would increase the deficit by approximately 1.0
percentage point of GDP.
All things considered, according to our baseline forecast tax
and contribution revenues, comprising the cornerstone of
revenues for the central budget and for the social security
system, are expected to decline between 2007 and 2009
consistently with the indications of the convergence
programme, although from a level of revenues higher than
assumed in the programme. As a long-term prospect for
bolstering economic growth, the only viable option for fiscal
policies is to decrease tax revenues relative to GDP, this
process in itself is not considered to go against a successful
fiscal adjustment programme. The future reform of the tax
system could provide the necessary stimulus for economic
growth, provided that such reform is designed not to increase
the tax burden on incomes, but it is rather aimed at
introducing a broader tax bases and hence distributing the
tax burden more evenly, and consequently reducing the tax
burden on incomes.
Government expenditures during the 2007–2009
period
The drop in government expenditures between 2007 and
2008 is still significant, however, it is attributed for the most
to changes (decline) to one-off expenditure items, and their
aggregate impact is estimated 1.0 per cent of GDP.
35
The
wage agreement relating to the public sector – if it is carried
out in full – could reduce the deficit by approximately 0.5
percentage points in 2007 and in 2008 in total. According to
our calculations, the part of the wage agreement pertaining to
2009 contains a slight increase in real wages for public
employers; we have shown the tension in this agreement as a
risk factor for 2009 (see later).
In the case of government agencies and chapter-administered
appropriations we agree with the expenditure target set out
by the Ministry of Finance for 2007; however, we would like
to point out that events of the first few months of this year
indicate a slightly asymmetrical distribution of risks pointing
towards higher expenditures. For the next two years we
assumed unchanged real costs and other expenditures relative
to GDP.
Substantial fiscal adjustment took place in connection with
the subsidies of pharmaceutical products. The measures
adopted bring lasting savings upon revising the extent of
subsidies in addition to changing the pricing mechanisms
pertaining to the subsidies provided for the various products
as well. 
As for pension expenses, we believe that the implementation
of an earlier government decision relating to small pension
payments has the capacity to offset, and to some extent
reverse the cost-saving effect of the Swiss index of previous
years, combined with the expected decline in the number of
and the changes in the composition of pensioners. Changing
the basis for the calculation of pension payments – changes in
the substitution rate and in the valorisation of incomes –
points towards lower pension payments. This impact,
however, will be dominant only over the long term, as it is
suggested by the fact that pension payments relative to GDP
in 2009 will be a little higher than the 2006 level. We do not
foresee any substantial savings between 2007 and 2009 in
connection with the changes implemented in the early
retirement system.
Major fiscal adjustments are taking place in the field of public
services. The key elements of the adjustment are increasing
revenues and decreasing price subsidies. These measures are
looked upon as lasting adjustments in several areas (natural
gas, utilities), and consistent with our forecast regarding
regulated prices, our forecast contains permanent reduction
in real terms in connection with this types of subsidies.
Deficit forecast and risk assessment for 2007
The 6 per cent baseline forecast relative to GDP we made for
the ESA deficit is built on the presumption that the so-called
balance reserves targeted in the budget act – comprising
about 0.4 per cent of GDP – will be allocated completely.
36
Our forecast pertaining to the ESA deficit – relative to the
November forecast – indicates a lower deficit approximately
by 1 percentage point of GDP. (In November, our baseline
scenario projected 6.5 per cent deficit, subject to ultimately
freezing the balance reserve of around 0.4 per cent of GDP.)
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35 Major one-off items: the one-off expenditures from the Gripen purchases reduce the deficit by 0.3 percentage point, motorway construction by 0.7 percentage point,
and MÁV capital injection by 0.3 percentage point, however, changes in the costs of the Budapest metro project will increase the expenditures by 0.3 percentage
point compared to 2007.
36 The budget act authorises the Government to release and refill the reserves blocked during the year if there is any surplus above the projected revenues for the
budget .
This major revision of our forecast is justified partly by the
unexpectedly favourable budgetary trends in 2006 –
exceeding our expectations –, partly by our forecasting rules.
One example of the latter is the changes made in the forecast
of the targeted pharmaceutical product subsidies.
37
Our baseline forecast for cash-based deficit is 0.9
percentage point below our November main scenario
relative to GDP. Fundamentally, it is the revenue side that
took a different path than we previously anticipated. The
remaining 0.1 percentage point difference is caused by
changes in accrual-based corrections. Changes in our
forecast relating to the cash-based balance are enumerated
in the table below. Let us note that our baseline forecast
assumes the implementation of the Ministry of Finance’s
forecast (published in April) regarding the expenditures of
public government agencies and chapter-administered
appropriations, which is the most dominant factor in the
expenditure side of the budget. This is a direct consequence
of our forecasting rules, on the other hand, in light of the
developments during the first four months we are of the
opinion that the forecast laid down by the Ministry of
Finance is feasible.
In connection with our baseline forecast for 2007 we have also
prepared the usual risk range. For our baseline scenario ESA-
balance we forecasted a risk range of 1.3 per cent of GDP. Risk
factors pointing towards higher deficit are related mostly to the
expenditure side, including the risks in the higher deficit of
local governments. Implementation of the proposed freezing of
wages in the public sector is questionable as far as local
governments and their institutions are concerned, as the
central government has no direct influence concerning the
wage policies of these authorities. Our baseline forecast was
compiled based on the assumption that the balance reserves
will be spent; therefore, if the unfavourable trends contained in
our risk assessment materialize in the remaining months of the
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37 In the beginning of November, the new Act on Supply of Medicinal Products was not yet approved therefore we could not apply the Government’s plans in our
baseline forecast in accordance with our forecasting rules. Following the adoption of the Act, and taking into account the changes in the drug subsidies our deficit
forecast was shifted downwards by 0.25 percentage point of GDP.
38 Our expert risk assessment does not contain the risk related to the changes in the usage of the so-called cash surplus accounts during the course of this year.
According to our estimate the so called cash surplus accounts, which are subject to liabilities, stand at around HUF 400 billion. If the Government was to release the
cash surplus accounts during the course of the year, it would mean a sum of HUF 100 to 120 billion according to our estimation, that would be spent this year (0.4-
0.5 per cent of GDP). 
Table 4-6
Changes in our forecast for the cash-based deficit
for 2007
(as a percentage of GDP)
1. Change in tax and social security 0.55contribution revenues
2. Change in other revenues 0.30
3. Net expenditure of budgetary -0.25institutions
4. Pension, pharmaceutical 0.15and health expenditures
5. Other expenditure, net 0.10
6. Change in interest balance 0.05
7. Total changes (1+...+6) 0.90
Table 4-7
Uncertainty in our deficit forecast for 2007 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Lower deficit Baseline projection for GFS deficit: -6.1 per cent Higher deficit
Higher tax and social security contribution revenues 0.3 Lower tax and social security contribution revenues -0.3
than in baseline projection than in baseline projection
Lower pension expenditure 0.1 Above-target expenditure of budgetary institutions -0.2
and chapters
Lower expenditure on pharmaceuticals 0.1 Higher-than-planned expenditure of social security system -0.2
(pensions, pharmaceuticals)
Higher surplus of extrabudgetary funds 0.1 Higher local government deficit -0.2
Higher-than-planned debt assumption -0.2
Higher deficit of extrabudgetary funds -0.1
Effect of favourable developments on balanc 0.6 Effect of unfavourable developments on balance -1.2
GFS deficit under favourable scenario -5.5 GFS deficit under unfavourable scenario -7.3
Change in the balance reserves 0.0 Change in the balance reserves +0.5
Corrections on ESA basis 0.1 Corrections on ESA basis 0.1
ESA deficit under favourable scenario -5.4 ESA deficit under unfavourable scenario -6.7
year, the ultimate freezing of balance reserve could assure the
fulfilment of the 6.8 per cent accrual-based budget deficit as
indicated in the convergence programme.
In our view, the tax and social security contribution revenues
can be the main driver of a lower-than-forecasted risk, where
extra tax revenues from taxes on consumption are likely;
furthermore, a potential source of a lower-than-forecasted
deficit is related to extra tax revenues generated through
improvements in the efficiency of tax collection procedures.
Our risk assessment contains the usual macroeconomic
risks
38
, and it does not cover the “extra” risk as to the
development of the fiscal path if certain government
measures were found unconstitutional. These types of extra
risks could be as high as 0.8 per cent of GDP, which would
increase significantly the risks imminent in the
implementation of the convergence programme. If this
scenario were to occur, it would bring about another fiscal
path with different macroeconomic impacts.
Trends in our baseline forecast in 2008-2009
According to our baseline forecast, the reduction of ESA-
deficit will remain extremely dynamic in 2008, however, the
dynamics will fall back considerably in 2009. It is apparent
that expenditure cuts determine the pace of reducing the
deficit, including the massive changes (decline) in the one-off
expenditure items. The level of revenues relative to GDP
from the major taxes will be lower, that – ceteris paribus –
tend to increase the deficit.
The use of EU funds will reduce the investment expenditures
of the general government, for the estimated costs of co-
financing are low. As for pension expenses, the extra
expenditures stemming from the government measures
already announced for the pension payment corrections will
neutralise the cost-saving effect of the Swiss index during
both years on aggregate. In the process of drawing up our
prognosis, we assumed that the number of pensioners will
increase significantly due to changes in the conditions for
retirement effective from 2008. The substantial shift in the
net expenditures of budgetary institutions is attributed, in
part, to the implementation of the wage agreement (salary-
base increase), while we predicted increases in the
expenditures related to the PPP schemes. The extremely high
figure of miscellaneous net expenses in 2008 is tied primarily
to the decreasing central government subsidies provided to
local governments.
Distribution of risks for 2008 and 2009
According to the distribution of risks in line with the baseline
scenario the fiscal deficit is likely to be lower than the targets
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39 Negative figures in the table mean to increase the deficit and vice versa.
Table 4-8
Components of changes in the cash-based deficit during 2008 and 200939
(as a percentage of GDP)
2008 2009
1. Total revenue (2+3+4+5) -0.4 -0.5
2. Taxes on consumption -0.3 -0.3
3. Corporate taxes 0.0 -0.1
4. PIT -0.1 -0.1
5. Social security contributions -0.1 -0.1
6. Total expenditure (7+...+13) 2.2 0.8
7. Price and housing subsidies 0.2 0.1
8. Net expenditure of budgetary institutions 0.3 -0.2
9. One-off items 1.0 0.3
10. Pharmaceuticals and health care 0.2 0.1
11. Pensions -0.1 0.1
12. Interest expenditure 0.1 0.1
13. Other expenditure, net 0.7 0.2
14. Balance of local government 0.1 0.1
15. Balance of extrabudgetary funds 0.0 0.0
16. Total changes (1+6+14+15) 1.9 0.4
of the convergence programme in 2007 and in 2008. In 2009
aour baseline forecast is slightly higher than in the
Convergence programme, with approximately symmetrical
risks.
In our calculations we distinguish two types of risks:
macroeconomic risks and expert risks, which are not related
to the macroeconomic risks directly.
40
Overall, we perceive minor downside risks originating from
the macroeconomic processes. A higher inflation path
resulting from the possible stagnation of inflation
expectations could have a role in increasing budget revenues
through the expansion of tax bases, and therefore, in
reducing the budget deficit. Additionally, the other
macroeconomic variables indicate symmetrical risks.
Among expert items, which do not depend directly on the
macroeconomic variables, we see risks slightly on the upside.
The expenditures of the government agencies and chapter-
administered appropriations constitute a major risk factor that
points towards higher deficit, especially developments in the
wages in the public sector, and the degree of adjustment of
local governments to the fiscal consolidation. On the other
hand, the potential co-financing of the Budapest metro project
by the EU, improvements in the efficiency of tax collection,
and discharging some of the investment expenditures of the
general government to PPP scheme point toward lower deficit.
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40 Expert risks could be e.g. the expenditures of the government agencies, budgetary institutions, real costs and investment expenditures of the local governments,
which are not influenced directly from the macroeconomic trends.
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There are new methodological instruments for the forecasting the
budget deficit. The existing system of expert forecasting, that is
consistent with the macroeconomic path, now includes model
calculations, allowing the incorporation of risk distribution factors in our
baseline forecast.
Due to methodological reasons, the asymmetry of distribution around
the baseline forecast is manifested in the difference between the
modus of distribution and the baseline forecast.
In the calculations we relied only on macroeconomic and
implementation risks; we did not assume the announced government
measures to change, or that any part of them will be withdrawn, or that
new sections will be appended. We indicate the degree of uncertainty
surrounding the forecast for the general government deficit on an
annual level. Interpretation of the ranges and the probability of the
areas they cover (thirty, sixty and ninety per cent) is consistent with the
interpretation of the ranges contained in the inflation and GDP fan
charts.
We prepared the distribution of uncertainty with model simulations, as
it ensures that the distribution of items which are tied to
macroeconomic variables – on the revenue side particularly VAT,
personal income taxes, corporate taxes and social security
contributions, and on the expenditure side pensions – is consistent with
the distribution of the determining variables (inflation, GDP, wages). In
the cases of inflation and GDP we used the probability factors contained
in the fan charts drawn up for these variables, while for the other
macroeconomic variables we relied on symmetrical uncertainty factors
and the variance calculated from the historical forecasting errors. As for
the other items of the whole general government deficit – the most
important of which are the expenditures of the central budget – the
distribution of uncertainty was determined by the experts who
prepared the baseline forecast.
Box 4–2 Methodology of the fiscal fan chart
In 2006, according to preliminary data, the sum of the
current account and capital account balance, meaning the
external financing requirement dropped significantly
compared to the previous year, and amounted to 5 per cent
of GDP. Due to the methodological uncertainty in
connection with the Balance of Payments statistics, the
external financing requirement determined from the
financing side is still considerably higher; however, regarding
its dynamics over the year the “bottom-up” external balance
indicator is also showing an improving tendency.
Most of the decline in the external financing requirement can
be attributed to the second half of the year in accordance
with developments in the real economy: rapid growth of
exports together with robust external demand and the
slowdown in the growth of internal demand – presumably
due in part to the fiscal adjustment measures – all point
towards the reduction of the external financing requirement.
This is also reflected by the seasonally adjusted real economy
balance, which was growing continuously in 2006 and closed
with a 600 million euro surplus for the year.
The massive reduction in the external financing requirement
during the second half of the year took place while the
savings of households were also declining, the general
government deficit was slightly decreasing in connection with
the austerity measures and the financing requirement of the
corporate sector (as a residual item) also dropped
considerably. The continued reduction in the financing
capacity of households during the second half of the year can
be related to the reduction in the disposable income of the
sector and to the consumption smoothing behaviour of
households. Thanks to the measures announced in the
convergence program, the financing requirement of the
consolidated general government relative to GDP shifted
from the 10 per cent level seen in the previous quarters, and
it showed a discernible decline. Basically, the combined
financing requirement of the two sectors did not change, but
the robust external economic activity and the substantial
decline in the investment activity of companies generated a
considerable decrease in the financing requirement of the
corporate sector.
As a result of the fiscal measures, in 2007 the GDP-
proportionate financing requirement of the consolidated
general government is expected to drop by 3 percentage
points, to 6.8 per cent. The financing capacity of households
is likely to drop below 2 per cent of GDP, on account of the
decrease in real incomes and consumption smoothing
behaviour. The profitability of the corporate sector could fall
due to increasing wage costs and to higher taxes and
contributions, which is expected to raise the sector’s
financing requirement together with slightly increasing
investment dynamics. In 2007, about half of the deficit
reducing effect of the fiscal adjustment measures may be
reflected in the reduction of the external financing
requirement, dropping to approximately 3.3 per cent of
GDP. In 2008, the financing requirement of the general
government is expected to drop by another 1.7 percentage
points, parallel with an additional 1 per cent reduction in the
external imbalance, and with a slight increase in the net
savings of households and the decline in the financing
capacity of the corporate sector induced by recovering
investment activity.
Regarding the structure of the current account balance,
improvements in the real economy balance could remain the
driving force to reduce the deficit even further. If the
favourable economic activity in Europe continues – as
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4.3. External balance
Chart 4-5
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* Adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on
account of EU accession and by the import increasing impact generated
by customs warehouses terminated due to EU accession.
** The financing capacity of the corporate sector is determined as a
residual item, therefore, it contains the errors of other statistics as well.
*** In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government
includes local governments, the ÁPV Rt., institutions attending to
quasi-fiscal duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest
Transport Limited [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing
capital projects initiated and controlled by the government and
formally implemented under PPP schemes.
forecasted – then the balance may improve by an additional
1.5 percentage points during the 2007-2008 period due to
substantial growth in exports and to low domestic
absorption. The GDP-proportionate deficit of the income
balance is expected to remain unchanged. In spite of the
decreasing external financing requirement, the growth of the
external debt of the national economy is likely to stop only in
2009. Hence, the GDP-proportionate payments on the debt
burden could remain unchanged as a result of the increasing
volume of outstanding debt and of the declining interest
payments due to the broader weight of foreign exchange
financing. Nevertheless, in the deficit of the income balance
relating to non-debt generating items we foresee a slight
decrease on the medium term, as the GDP-proportionate
income from non-debt capital investments made by large
domestic corporations in connection with their foreign
acquisitions may rise slightly from the current low level. Due
to the increasing volume of European Union funds, the
capital account balance may improve by approximately 1.5
per cent of GDP by 2009.
EXTERNAL BALANCE
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Table 4-9
Net financing capacity of the sectors relative to the GDP
(in percentage of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Estimation Forecast
I. Consolidated general government* -8.6 -8.3 -8.4 -9.2 -9.9 -6.8 -5.1 -4.6
II. Households 2.7 0.2 2.4 4.2 2.9 1.8 2.1 3.0
Corporate sector and “error” (= A - I.- II. ) -0.8 0.1 -2.1 -1.1 2.0 1.7 0.7 -0.2
A. External financing capacity. “from above”(=B+C )** -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.1 -5.0 -3.3 -2.3 -1.8
B. Current account balance** -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.9 -5.8 -4.7 -4.4 -4.2
- in EUR billions ** -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.1 -5.2 -4.9 -4.9 -4.9
C. Capital account balance 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.4
D. Net errors and omissions (NEO)*** 0.3 0.3 -1.7 -2.1 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0
External financing capacity “from below” (=A+D) -6.4 -7.7 -9.8 -8.2 -8.0 -6.3 -5.3 -4.8
* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, the ÁPV Rt., institutions attending to quasi-fiscal
duties (Hungarian State Railways [MÁV], Budapest Transport Limited [BKV]), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and
controlled by the government and formally implemented under PPP schemes.
** During the 2004–2006 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics points toward higher current account deficit and higher
external financing requirement.
*** In our forecast for the “errors and omissions” line of the current account we assumed that the cumulated GDP-proportionate figure for the last four
quarters will remain unchanged.
Table 4-10
GDP-proportionate structure of the current account balance*
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
1. Balance of goods and services ** -1.5 -2.3 -3.8 -2.7 -0.8 0.7 1.9 2.2 2.3
2. Income balance -5.4 -5.4 -4.9 -6.0 -6.2 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.7
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
I. Current account balance (1+2+3)** -6.1 -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.9 -5.8 -4.7 -4.4 -4.2
Current account balance in EUR billions** -3.6 -5.0 -5.9 -6.9 -6.1 -5.2 -4.9 -4.9 -4.9
II. Capital account balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.4 2.1 2.4
External financing capacity (I+II)** -5.5 -6.7 -8.0 -8.1 -6.1 -5.0 -3.3 -2.3 -1.8
* The prognosis includes in 2006–2007 the import resulting from the Hungarian Army’s Gripen fighter lease, amounting to close to 0.3 per cent of the
GDP. 
** During the 2004–2009 period, uncertainty in the measurement of foreign trade statistics point toward higher current account deficit and higher
external financing requirement.
Financing of the current account deficit
During the second half of 2006, the “bottom-up” external
financing requirement was around EUR 3 billion, which
represents 7.4 per cent of GDP, taking into account the
seasonality as well. The EUR 500 million in net non-debt
generating financing is considered very low compared to
previous periods; therefore, the majority of the total
financing requirement was covered by debt-generating
funds. However, the unfavourable developments in the
financing structure from the standpoint of investors during
the second half of 2006 are also the cause of contradicting
tendencies, some of which may be attributed to one-off
effects:
• The historically low EUR 560 million net inflow of direct
investment comprises a substantial working capital inflow,
which, however, was offset for the most part by the record
high capital export, amounting to EUR 1.8 billion, in
connection with the expansion of domestic banks abroad.
• The negative balance of portfolio investments in stocks also
materialized in an environment characterised by significant
internal and external activity. On the one hand, the trend
of capital export that was seen during the decline in the
stock exchange index during May and June turned around
in the second half of the year, and foreign investors once
again purchased portfolio shares worth EUR 600 million;
while local institutional investors, on the other hand,
increased their investment in foreign shares by close to
EUR 660 million.
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PUBLICATIONS OF THE MAGYAR
NEMZETI BANK
Quarterly Report on Inflation
published four times a year in order to enable the public to
understand and clearly follow the central bank’s policy. In this
publication the MNB regularly reports on the past and expected
developments in inflation, and evaluates those macroeconomic
processes that affect inflation. This publication also presents
summaries of the forecasts and considerations that constitute a
basis for the Monetary Council’s decisions.
Report on Financial Stability
published once a year. This report outlines the position of the
central bank vis-à-vis the changes in the financial system, and
describes the effect of these changes on the stability of the
financial system. 
Annual Report
This publication contains the central bank’s business report
on the previous year and its audited financial statements.
Analysis on the Convergence Process
This publication was first issued by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
in 2005, to be issued annually in November. With this
publication the MNB wishes to provide information to
decision-makers, experts and the wider public which
improves their knowledge of the rather complex issues
related to membership in the monetary union.
MNB Occasional Papers
In this series economic analyses related to monetary decision-
making by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank are published. The
series aims at increasing the transparency of monetary policy.
Thus, in addition to studies also describing technical details
of forecasting, economic issues arising during decision-
making are published as well.
MNB Working Papers
These publications contain the results of analyses and research
works conducted at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. The analyses
reflect the opinions of the authors, and may not necessarily
coincide with the official stance of the MNB. Since the
autumn of 2005 the series has been available only in English.
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